Daf Yomi for Women - Hadran

Episod

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  Bekhorot 8 - Shabbat, 1st Day of Sukkot - September 26, 15 Tishrei 25.09.2026 45min
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  Bekhorot 7 - September 25, 14 Tishrei 25.09.2026 49min

  Does Rabbi Shimon require an offspring to resemble its mother in its head and most of its body (ראשו ורובו) to be permitted for consumption, or does his requirement of its head and most of its body apply exclusively to firstborn (bekhorah) status? Three braitot are brought to answer this question, but all are deemed inconclusive. Is donkey urine permitted or forbidden? While horse and camel urine are thin and clearly just excreted water, donkey urine is thick and resembles milk. Is it absorbed and derived from the animal's body (and thus forbidden as an excretion of a non-kosher animal), or is it merely ingested water that became cloudy from body heat? Rav Sheshet proves from our Mishna ("that which emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher") that donkey urine is forbidden because it derives from a non-kosher species. There are two versions of Rav Sheshet's proof and how it is derived from the Mishna, with potential halakhic ramifications between the two versions. A difficulty is raised against Rav Sheshet's opinion from a braita permitting honey—even though it is produced in the body of a non-kosher creature—as it comes from something outside the body. To resolve this, it is explained that Rav Sheshet follows a different tanna who permits honey because it is derived from a drasha in the Torah and is an exception to the rule, not the rule. Fallow deer secretions (chalei d'yachmurta) and the skin/placenta covering a donkey foal's face (or haba k'neged panav) are permitted as mere waste matter (pirsha). If a non-kosher fish swallows a kosher fish, the swallowed kosher fish is permitted for consumption. However, if a kosher fish swallows a non-kosher fish, the non-kosher fish remains forbidden because it is not the product of the kosher fish's growth. If one did not witness the swallowing, one might assume a non-kosher fish found inside a kosher fish was actually birthed by it (as non-kosher fish give birth to live young, while kosher fish lay eggs). This last point raises a difficulty, which four answers are brought to resolve.
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  Bekhorot 6 - September 24, 13 Tishrei 24.09.2026 49min

  Following the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yosi HaGelili, where each derived from a different verse the exemption from firstborn status for an animal that gave birth to an offspring resembling a different species, the Gemara clarifies what Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from the proof-verses of our tanna ("peter hamor" twice). Rabbi Yosi HaGelili derives from there the source for exempting horses and camels from firstborn status. Rav Achai raises a difficulty against his derivation, but the Gemara answers his objection. Our tanna derives this rule (exempting the firstborn of horses and camels) from a general rule and a detail (klal u'phrat): "All your livestock you shall designate as male" is a general rule, "ox and sheep and donkey" is a detail, and a general rule includes only that which is in the detail; therefore, firstborn laws apply only to a donkey and not to other non-kosher animals. The Gemara discusses a series of uncertainties regarding an animal that gave birth to a different species that possesses some of the mother's features: regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, do we judge it like a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring that looks somewhat like its mother, which is subject to firstborn status because both are subject to firstborn status, or perhaps here the laws are different because one is sanctified with intrinsic holiness (kedushat haguf) and the other with monetary value (kedushat damim), and one is kosher while the other is not? Subsequently, the Gemara inquires about a donkey that gave birth to a horse-like offspring and a cow that gave birth to a horse-like offspring. From the braitot, the Gemara proves that the obligation when there are partial features was stated regarding a cow that gave birth to a donkey-like offspring, but it remains unclear regarding the other questions. Regarding eating, the Mishna clarifies the principle that what emerges from the non-kosher is non-kosher, and it is not judged according to the offspring's appearance but rather according to its mother - this rule was intended to remember the law. The source showing that a kosher animal born from a non-kosher mother is forbidden to be eaten is from the verse "These you shall not eat," whereas a non-kosher offspring born from a kosher mother is permitted, as it is said, "the camel... it is non-kosher" - it is non-kosher, but a non-kosher born from a kosher mother is kosher. Rabbi Shimon disagrees and forbids a non-kosher animal born from a kosher mother based on the repetition of the word "camel" in Leviticus and Deuteronomy, and he derives the prohibition of milk from a non-kosher animal from the phrase "et ha-gamal" (the camel), whereas the Sages forbid milk from "camel" "camel" and do not derive laws from the word "et." To show that there are those who derive laws from the word, et, the Gemara brings the position  of Shimon HaAmsoni, who derives laws from that word, but changed his position when he reached "You shall fear the Lord (et Hashem) your God," until Rabbi Akiva came and taught that it serves to include Torah scholars. The Gemara clarifies why a special verse was needed to forbid the milk of a non-kosher animal and presents two possible explanations. Afterwards, it discusses the source for permitting the milk of a kosher animal and presents six proofs, of which three are rejected. The Gemara cites a braita stating that a sheep that gave birth to a goat-like offspring or a goat that gave birth to a sheep-like offspring is exempt from firstborn status unless it possesses some of the mother's features, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees, maintaining that it is not obligated until its head and most of its body resemble its mother. The Gemara concludes with the question: Does Rabbi Shimon require its head and most of its body to resemble its mother regarding the prohibition of eating as well?
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  Bekhorot 5 - September 23, 12 Tishrei 23.09.2026 50min

  The Gemara continues analyzing the dispute regarding whether firstborns were sanctified in the desert. According to Reish Lakish, they were not sanctified until entering the Land, whereas Rabbi Yochanan holds they were already sanctified in the wilderness. Rabbi Eleazar explains that Rabbi Yochanan derived his position from the verse "לי יהיו" ("they shall be Mine") – b'havayatan yehu, meaning that their holiness remains intact and does not lapse. Rabbi Yochanan explains the verse "והיה כי יביאך... והעברת" in accordance with the exposition of the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael: perform this mitzva so that you will inherit and enter the Land. Rav Mordechai notes to Rav Ashi that in his academy the dispute was taught with reversed attributions - Rabbi Yochanan said they were not sanctified (meaning they did not need to be sanctified anew), while Reish Lakish said they were sanctified. Rav Ashi clarifies that the underlying explanatory principle is the exact same, but a person is obligated to speak in the language of his teacher. Two questions are asked by the officer Quntroqos to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai. First, regarding the discrepancy between the detailed count of Levites (22,300) and their total sum (22,000), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai explains that those additional 300 Levites were firstborns themselves, and a firstborn cannot discharge the firstborn obligation of another, as Abaye adds that it suffices for a firstborn to discharge his own personal holiness. Second, regarding the discrepancy between the silver collected (half a shekel for 601,550 men, equaling 201 kikar and 11 maneh) and the silver gathered and accounted for (100 kikar and 1,775 shekels, which equals 101 kikar and 11 maneh), Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai responds that Moses our teacher was a trustworthy treasurer and skilled calculator, and that the sanctuary maneh was doubled. After two failed attempts, Rav Chisda proves from a verse in Ezekiel that the sanctuary maneh was indeed doubled, and the Gemara establishes three principles regarding measures: additions may be made to measurements, additions cannot exceed a sixth, and this sixth is calculated from the outside. Rabbi Chanina relates three questions he asked Rabbi Eliezer in the Great Academy. Regarding why firstborn donkeys were singled out for redemption over horses or camels, Rabbi Eliezer explains that it is a divine decree (gezeirat hakatav), and also because donkeys assisted Israel during the Exodus, as every Israelite brought out ninety loaded Libyan donkeys with the silver and gold of Egypt. Regarding the place names Rephidim and Shittim, Rabbi Eliezer holds that they are literal place names, whereas Rabbi Yehoshua interprets them homiletically as allusions to behavior: Rephidim signifies that they loosened their grasp on Torah study, and Shittim signifies that they engaged in acts of folly. The Mishna rules that a cow giving birth to an offspring resembling a donkey, or a donkey giving birth to an offspring resembling a horse, is exempt from bekhora, as the repetition of the words "peter chamor" teaches that both the mother and offspring must be donkeys. Regarding consumption, an offspring born of a kosher animal that resembles an non-kosher animal is permitted to be eaten, while an offspring born of a non-kosher animal that resembles a kosher animal is forbidden, based on the principle that whatever emerges from the non-kosher is not kosher, and whatever emerges from the kosher is kosher. The Gemara compares our Mishna to a Mishna dealing with a ewe that gave birth to an offspring resembling a goat. Rav Yehuda derives from the verse "אך בכור שור..." that both parent and offspring must be of the same species, instead of using the verse in our Mishna. The Gemara explains the dispute between the tanna of our Mishna and Rabbi Yose HaGelili (upon whose view Rav Yehuda relied) regarding whether the textual derivations apply to monetary consecration (kedushat damim) and from there we learn to inherent sanctity (kedushat haguf) or the reverse. What does each do with the verse of the other?
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  Bekhorot 4 - September 22, 11 Tishrei 22.09.2026 49min

  The Mishna rules that Kohanim and Levites are exempt from bekhora (firstborn male donkeys) based on a kal v'chomer: if they exempted the firstborns of Israelites in the desert, logic dictates that they exempt their own. The Gemara challenges the Mishna's premise as the Levites themselves did not exempt the donkeys of the Israelites – they themselves exempted the Israelite firstborn males, and their animals exempted the Israelite firstborn donkeys. Two answers are offered to resolve this question, by both Abaye and Rava. Abaye answers that the Mishna means the livestock of the Levites exempted their own livestock. Rava rejects Abaye's interpretation on two grounds: first, the Mishna uses the verb "they exempted", referring to the Levites themselves; second, if Abaye were correct, Levites' kosher firstborn animals should be exempt from bekhora also, yet a Mishna explicitly teaches that Kohanim and Levites are obligated in the firstborn of kosher animals and exempt only from redeeming their sons (pidyon haben) and firstborn donkey (peter chamor). Rava provides his own answer, explaining that the Levites exempted themselves (their human firstborns) via kal v'chomer from what transpired in the desert where the Levites exempted the Israelite firstborns. To derive their exemption from the firstborn donkey (peter chamor), the Gemara cites a verse equating human firstborns with impure animal firstborns ("האדם ואת בכור הבהמה הטמאה תפדה"), establishing that whoever is exempt from human firstborn is exempt from the redemption of the donkeys. Rav Safra raises four difficulties against both Abaye and Rava: if the exemption depends on the Levites' exchange in the desert, what about those who were not involved in the exemption, such as a Levite who did not own animals or was under a month old, or a female Levite, or Aharon? All difficulties are resolved. Three other questions are asked and answered, namely, the source for kohanim being included in this exemption, that this exemption applies for future generations, and that the redemption of a firstborn donkey in the desert was performed specifically with a lamb (seh) just as it is for future generations. Rav Chanina states that a single lamb belonging to a Levite exempted multiple firstborn donkeys of Israelites in the desert. Abaye attempts to prove this from the fact that Scripture notes how many excess human firstborns there were compared to Levites, but did not mention any excess firstborn animals. After rejecting Abaye's proof, the Gemara proves this from the precise phrasing "ואת בהמת הלוים תחת בהמתם" – "an animal (single) of the Levites in place of their (Israelites) animals (plural)", and Rava notes that this aligns with a Mishna ruling that one may redeem with a lamb multiple times, and the Gemara explains that Rabbi Chanina's statement was meant to give the reason for that Mishna. Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish from two tannaitic sources, but both difficulties against Reish Lakish are resolved. An alternative version suggests that the second difficulty was brought by Reish Lakish to challenge Rabbi Yochanan's position. A third source is brought by the Gemara to prove Rabbi Yochanan's position, but Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak provides an alternative explanation of that source to reconcile it with Reish Lakish. Following a difficulty on this explanation, raised by Rav Papa, the Gemara is forced to slightly adjust Reish Lakish's view: it is clear that at the beginning of their stay in the desert, firstborns were sanctified; according to Reish Lakish, it was only after that specific event (the exchange of the firstborns for the Levites) that they ceased to sanctify them until entering the Land of Israel.
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  Bekhorot 3 - Yom Kippur - September 21, 10 Tishrei 20.09.2026 40min
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  Bekhorot 2 - September 20, 9 Tishrei 20.09.2026 46min

  The Mishna rules that if a Jew buys a donkey embryo from a non-Jew, sells one to him, enters into a partnership with him, or receives or gives an animal under a sharecropping agreement (kablanut), the offspring is exempt from bekhora. The Gemara questions why the Mishna needs to enumerate all these individual cases, and explains that each is necessary: selling must be taught so we do not fine a Jew who removes an animal from sanctity; partnering excludes Rabbi Yehuda's view that a joint partnership with a non-Jew is obligated in bekhora; and sharecropping (kablanut) is needed because the primary animal belongs to the Jew, and had we exempted it from the firstborn law, we might have thought this would cause people to think that in a regular animal there is no law of firstborn. The Gemara asks what Rabbi Yehuda's position is regarding selling an embryo to a non-Jew, given that he elsewhere permits selling a broken animal (shevura). Is an embryo treated like a broken animal because it cannot work, or is selling an embryo forbidden because it is standard practice, unlike a broken animal where there is a clear distinction (heker) since it is not standard practice? The Gemara first attempts to prove this from the Mishna, which mentions that selling an embryo is forbidden without noting a dissenting opinion. However, this proof is rejected, as Rabbi Yehuda clearly disagrees with another part of the Mishna without being mentioned there, so no proof can be brought from the Mishna. Next, a braita detailing fines for sharecropping (kablanut) transactions is brought to show that Rabbi Yehuda forbids it. However, the Gemara rejects this proof, clarifying that the fine in the braita applies specifically when giving a pregnant animal to be fattened. Ultimately, Rav Ashi proves from Rabbi Yehuda's own rationale in another braita—that a broken animal is permitted because it cannot heal—which implies that selling an embryo is forbidden, as it naturally grows and "heals." This entire sugya was also taught in a different manner, as a question of whether the Mishna's prohibition on selling an embryo is only according to the Rabbis or if Rabbi Yehuda agrees with it as well. As in the previous version, the conclusion is that Rabbi Yehuda also forbids it. The Gemara asks whether selling a healthy animal solely for its fetus is permitted, analyzing the doubts according to both Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. An attempt is made to resolve the question from the Mishna regarding one who gives an animal under sharecropping (kablanut for offspring), as the phrase "even though he is not permitted" is omitted there. However, the Gemara ultimately concludes that in other forbidden cases (such as partnership) the Tanna also omits "even though he is not permitted," so no answer to the question can be derived from the Mishna.
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  Introduction to Masechet Bekhorot with Dr. Ayelet Hoffman Libson 18.09.2026 19min

  Introduction to Masechet Bekhorot
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  Chullin 142 - Siyum Masechet Chullin - Shabbat September 19, 8 Tishrei 18.09.2026 16min

  Hadran Ceremony Text
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  Chullin 141 - September 18, 7 Tishrei 18.09.2026 45min
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  Chullin 140 - September 17, 6 Tishrei 17.09.2026 49min

  Study Guide The Gemara explains that the word "tzipor" includes only kosher birds, excluding non-kosher birds from the commandment of shiluch haken. Four additional verses are brought (supplementing the four from Chullin 139) in an attempt to disprove this premise. However, each verse is explained in a different manner, demonstrating that "tzipor" indeed refers exclusively to kosher birds. If the eggs are non-kosher, the commandment also does not apply, as derived from Rav Kahana's exposition of "take for yourself" - and not for your dogs. Rav Kahana's exposition was originally cited to derive the rule that if the chicks are a treifa, the mitzva does not apply, whereas if the mother is a treifa, the mitzva remains in effect. Various Sages raise several questions regarding situations where the obligation to send away the mother bird might not apply, such as when a barrier exists between the mother and the eggs, or when the mother bird broods over eggs of a different species. While Rabbi Eliezer and the Sages disagree concerning a male pheasant, Rabbi Elazar clarifies that their disagreement is strictly limited to that specific case. For a female pheasant, all agree the mitzva applies, while for a standard male of another species, all agree it does not apply. The Mishna rules that if a bird is hovering over the chicks or eggs without touching them, the commandment is in effect only if her wings touch the nest. Rav Yehuda rules in the name of Rav that in a case where the mother bird is sitting on tree branches such that if they were removed she would fall onto the eggs, the commandment is in effect even if she is not presently touching them. A braita is brought to contradict his ruling, but the contradiction is resolved. The Gemara then presents an alternative version in which the braita is cited to support his statement, though this support is ultimately rejected.
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  Chullin 139 - September 16, 5 Tishrei 16.09.2026 48min

  Ravina derives from "shaleach teshalach" that a kosher bird that killed a human, before it is convicted, it is exempt from shiluach haken because one is commanded to bring it to court rather than send it away. The Mishna ruled that consecrated birds are exempt from the mitzva of shiluach haken. The Gemara attempts to find a case of sanctified birds that would require an exemption. After four failed attempts, Rav and Shmuel each bring a possible explanation. Rav explains that it refers to one who consecrated the offspring of his dovecote for a sacrifice, which subsequently escaped, retains its sanctity and it is exempt from the mitzva of shiluach haken. Shmuel explains that it refers to one who consecrated a domestic hen to Temple maintenance (bedek habayit) which then escaped, which retains its sanctity as wherever it is, it belongs to God, based on the principle "l'Hashem haaretz u'mlo'ah." Rabbi Yochanan agrees with Shmuel and Reish Lakish with Rav. However, Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish disagree in a different case and their positions are reversed. The Gemara works to resolve the contradictions. Analyzing the verse in the Torah, Devarim 22:6, the braita shows the derivation of the different laws listed in the Mishna while adding others, and the Gemara analyzes and somewhat edits the braita. The braita derived from the word "tzipor," that the law applies only to kosher birds. The Gemara explains that this word always refers to kosher birds, while the word "עוף" includes not kosher birds as well. Several verses are brought to challenge this theory, but are resolved. 
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  Chullin 138 - September 15, 4 Tishrei 15.09.2026 47min

  Reconciling Rav's two rulings on the required fleece yield, where he states "a mane and a half" (mane v'pras) in one context and "sixty" in another, the Gemara explains that Rav refers to a mane of forty sela'im, making a mane and a half equal to sixty sela'im. Regarding the five-sela'im gift, a braita clarifies that the owner is not required to bleach the wool before giving it; rather, he must provide enough wool so that five sela'im remain after the kohen bleaches it. Deriving from "l'amod l'sharet" ("to stand and serve"), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explains that the gift must yield enough processed wool to weave a small priestly garment - specifically identifying the belt (avnet) as the smallest garment used in Temple service. If one shears each sheep and immediately sells it before shearing the next, Rav Chisda obligates the owner because shearing occurred under one's ownership, whereas Rabbi Natan bar Hoshaya exempts because complete flock ownership was lacking when the total required quantity was met (when all five sheep were sheared). In sales where a buyer purchases shearings from a flock, if the seller keeps some of the shearings, the seller is obligated in the mitzva. The amoraim try to find a tannaitic opinion by which to explain this ruling. Rav Chisda's suggestion is rejected, and Rava connects it with a Mishna regarding the priestly gifts. A seller cannot sell the kohen's portion as it does not belong to the seller, but to the kohen. Thus, if the seller retained any shearings, the liability remains with the seller, but if no shearings were retained, liability falls upon the buyer. Beginning Chapter 12, the Mishna defines the mandate to send away the mother bird (shiluach haken), contrasting its scope with the commandments in the previous chapters. Rabbi Avin and Rabbi Meisha compare the structure of the previous chapters and highlight which laws were necessary, and which were brought just as a foil. The Gemara explains why consecrated birds as well as a kosher bird condemned by a court are exempt from this commandment.
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  Chullin 137 - September 14, 3 Tishrei 14.09.2026 44min

  Study Guide The obligation of reshit ha'gez (first shearing) applies exclusively to sheep. Although the Gemara initially suggests a gezeira shava comparing "gez" in Deuteronomy 18:5 to Job 31:20 ("m'gez kvasai yitchamam"), it ultimately derives the requirement from the phrase "l'amod l'sharet", establishing that the material must be fit for priestly service. This excludes goat hair - which is used for sackcloth rather than garments - as well as coarse wool. Washing sheep, which causes some wool to be removed, is subject to a Tannaitic debate: Rabbi Yosi exempts washing from the commandment to give the first shearing because it is not the typical method of shearing, whereas the rabbis obligate it as it does remove the wool. The Tannaim dispute the minimum flock size required: Beit Shammai require two sheep based on the plural "tzon", Beit Hillel require five ("chamesh tzon asuyot"), and Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi requires four based on the laws of theft of "tzon" where the penalty is four "tzon". Rebbi shows preference to the ruling of Rabbi Yishmael b'Rabbi Yosi for a number of reasons, and Rabbi Yochanan explains that there is an established tradition from Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi to hold like him. Addressing fleece quantities, the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Dosa ben Harkinas, ruling that any amount of shearing from five sheep triggers liability, which the Amoraim quantify through various minimum amounts, and only one of the three positions takes their words literally that there is no minimum. Rav requires 37.5 sela'im, Shmuel requires sixty, while requiring 1:60 for the kohen, Rabbi Yochanan requires six sela'im with five going to the kohen. The Gemara tries to reconcile these views with the Mishna's rule requiring five sela'im given to the kohen. Rav and Shmuel compare this rabbinic 1:60 baseline to the standards for teruma and peah, prompting a discussion in the Gemara reconciling these baselines against conflicting sources. When Isi bar Hini travels to Eretz Yisrael, Rabbi Yochanan criticizes him both for errors in his text of the Mishna and for not demonstrating enough respect toward Rav. Rabbi Yochanan also presents his position on the Rabbis' view of "any amount" (kol shehu), which initially appears to contradict his earlier statement in the sugya. When Rav Dimi arrives from Eretz Yisrael and transmits Rabbi Yochanan's teaching, Abaye deduces from it how to resolve the contradiction.
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  Chullin 136 - 2nd Day of Rosh Hashana - September 13, 2 Tishrei 11.09.2026 48min

  Study Guide
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  Chullin 135 - 1st Day of Rosh Hashana - September 12, 1 Tishrei 11.09.2026 47min
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  Chullin 134 - September 11, 29 Elul 11.09.2026 48min
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  Chullin 133 - September 10, 28 Elul 10.09.2026 47min

  Rav Chisda's requirement for complete mastery of all twenty-four priestly gifts is rejected based on Rabbi Simeon's standard: any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh b'avoda) is eligible to receive gifts. Deriving from "v'natan" ("and he shall give"), kohanim are forbidden from grabbing gifts, prompting Abaye to outline his personal practice that developed from seizing gifts to eventually refusing them altogether, except on the Eve of Yom Kippur to demonstrate his priestly lineage. Rav Yosef rules that a kohen can assign gifts to an impoverished scholar even before taking physical possession. However, when Rava insisted a host's servant assign gifts to himself and Rav Safra, Rava ate while Rav Safra refrained; Rav Safra subsequently experienced a troubling dream regarding improper conduct, prompting the Gemara into a broader ethical discussion condemning the instruction of an unworthy student who will misconstrue the teacher's words. Addressing mixed partnerships with a non-Jew or kohen, the Gemara clarifies contradictory sources regarding when marking the animal is required to prevent public suspicion (mar'it ayin). Resolving a dispute between Rav Huna and Chiya bar Rav, the Gemara rejects Chiya bar Rav - explaining his misinterpretation of the braita listing the twenty-four priestly gifts - and concludes that a kohen's partial ownership in a specific section of an animal exempts only that corresponding gift, such that partial ownership of the head exempts the jaw, while the foreleg and abomasum remain obligated. Where an Israelite owns the head and a kohen owns the rest of the body, the Gemara establishes that halakhic liability follows the locus of obligation, requiring the Israelite to give the jaw.
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  Chullin 132 - September 9, 27 Elul 09.09.2026 48min

  The eligibility of a Kohen's daughter (kohenet) to receive priestly gifts (matanot) is disputed between Rava (forbidding) and Ulla (permitting), reflecting a broader Tannaitic disagreement between the academy of Rabbi Yishmael (excluding a kohenet) and the academy of Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov (including her). Following common practice where several amoraim received and ate matanot on account of their wives, Marimar codifies four definitive rulings: the halakha follows Rav regarding the unenforceability of Levite obligations, Rav Chisda regarding exemption from restitution for destroyed gifts, Ulla permitting gifts to a kohenet, and Rav Adda bar Ahava regarding pidyon haben exemptions for a Levite woman's son. Regarding crossbred animals (kil'ayim) and a koy, the Sages obligate matanot while Rabbi Eliezer exempts them. Addressing the underlying doubt over paternal seed (zera ha'av), the Gemara questions why the Sages require full gifts rather than half-gifts, ultimately explaining that the obligation of the rabbis is only for half. However an alternative explanation is brought concluding that explicit scriptural inclusions ("im shor", "im seh") mandate full obligation. This discussion also establishes Rava's rule that legal recourse for unseparated gifts lies directly against the butcher (hadin im hatabach). The Mishna notes that a blemished firstborn (bechor) mixed among non-sacred animals or slaughtering for a non-Jew or kohen creates exemptions from matanot. However, a kohen slaughtering for someone else is obligated in matanot. A kohen who sets up a slaughterhouse is exempt from giving gifts for two to three weeks, but becomes obligated once his business is more established. To ensure compliance, courts may penalize non-compliant butchers by excommunication. Matanot must be eaten roasted with mustard as they should be eaten like royalty, and may be given to any kohen who acknowledges the validity of the Temple service (modeh ba'avoda). 
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  Chullin 131 - September 8, 26 Elul 08.09.2026 47min

  Rav Chisda rules that anyone who destroys or eats priestly gifts (zero'a, lechayayim, keva) prior to distribution is exempt from financial restitution, whether derived from the word "zeh" in the verse or because these gifts constitute property with no specific claimant (mamon she-ein lo tove'in). The Gemara raises seven challenges from various Tannaitic sources (including rulings on other priestly gifts and poor-person's gifts)—some directed against Rav Chisda's overall exemption from restitution, and others against the explanation that it constitutes property with no specific claimant. The Gemara resolves all of these challenges, upholding Rav Chisda's position. The Gemara then turns to evaluate whether Levites are obligated to give priestly gifts when slaughtering their own non-sacred animals. Rav remains in doubt as to whether Levites are legally included in the biblical description of "from the nation" (me'et ha-am) or whether their tribe's distinct status exempts them from giving matanot; consequently, while Levites are technically obligated to give them, this obligation cannot be legally enforced against them. The Gemara presents three challenges against Rav's uncertainty from explicit braitot, but answers all of them, leaving Rav's underlying doubt intact. Mareimar rules halakhically in accordance with both Rav Chisda and Rav's doubt. Finally, Ulla permitted giving priestly gifts to a kohen's daughter, even if she is married to an Israelite. Rava challenges Ulla's ruling from the laws regarding the meal-offering (minchah) of a kohen's daughter, which differs from that of a male kohen in that it is not completely burned on the altar, demonstrating that her status as a priestess is not entirely identical.