Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Afleveringen

• 
  SH302: Why Rules Get Broken. Does It Matter Who Is Breaking Them? 05.08.2026 17min

  This episode explores why rule-breaking in diving is often more complicated than simply “breaking the rules.” It looks at the difference between shortcuts that organisations quietly depend on to keep operating and personal shortcuts taken for convenience or ego. Through real-world examples, the discussion explains how hindsight can unfairly turn system-wide problems into individual blame after an incident occurs. The episode also examines why teams often stay silent when they notice problems, how social pressure affects decision-making, and why genuine learning requires understanding the reality of how diving actually works rather than relying on simple explanations. Ultimately, it challenges divers, instructors, and leaders to recognise the difference between necessary adaptations and risky personal shortcuts before something goes wrong.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-rules-get-brokenLinks: Blog about how conditions shape actions: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditionsMaster thesis about storytelling to learn: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceGuide to speaking truth to power: https://www.thehumandiver.com/resourcesTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH301: Eight Questions About the Maldives Dive Accident 01.08.2026 33min

  This episode examines the deaths of five Italian divers in the Maldives and a Maldivian military diver who later died during the recovery operation, using the tragedy to explore how Just Culture approaches accidents in high-risk environments. Rather than rushing to blame individuals, the discussion walks through the Eight-Question Review framework, which looks first at the wider system: authority, procedures, training, resources, organisational culture, operational norms, and the pressures influencing decisions. The episode highlights how experienced scientific divers can still face hidden competence gaps when moving into technical cave environments, how commercial and research pressures can shape risk-taking, and how safety rules may drift away from everyday practice over time. It also explores the dangers of hindsight bias and why meaningful investigations must focus on understanding how decisions made sense to those involved at the time, not simply judging outcomes after the fact. The central message is that accidents rarely come from one bad decision alone, but from interacting conditions within a wider system—and that real learning only happens when we are willing to ask difficult questions before assigning blame.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/eight-questions-about-maldives-accidentLinks: Blog about the Chac Mool deaths: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityFurther reading on The Human Diver:Change your Language, Change the WorldThey Lost Situation AwarenessThe Eight-Question Review — LFEO courseTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH300: "We want accountability." 29.07.2026 5min

  This episode reflects on the tragic deaths of five Italian divers in the Maldives and a Maldivian military diver who died while trying to recover them, using the event to explore what real accountability should look like after a diving accident. Rather than rushing to blame or making assumptions based on limited information, the discussion challenges the diving community to resist quick judgement and focus instead on understanding the conditions, decisions, and systems that may have shaped the outcome. It examines the difference between backward-looking accountability, which seeks someone to blame, and forward-looking accountability, which asks better questions about training, equipment, oversight, environmental conditions, and the support given to those involved in both the original dive and the recovery effort. At a time when facts are still emerging, the episode argues that meaningful learning begins with humility, patience, and a commitment to understanding what really happened—because only then can the diving community improve and better protect those who dive and those asked to rescue others.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/we-want-accountabilityTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH299: When we ask 'What conditions made this more likely?' perspectives (should) change 25.07.2026 8min

  This episode challenges the instinct to explain diving accidents by focusing only on individual mistakes or broken rules. Instead, it explores how social, cultural, organisational, and environmental conditions shape the decisions divers make, even when those decisions seem irrational in hindsight. Using recent diving incidents as examples, the discussion highlights how behaviour that appears risky often made sense to those involved at the time, influenced by pressures such as authority, identity, time, and the expectation to “get the job done.” The episode introduces the PETTEOT framework—Person(s), Environment, Tasks, Tools and Technology, External Influences, Organisation, and Time—as a way to better understand how different parts of the diving system interact to create both success and failure. By moving beyond blame and examining the wider system, divers, instructors, and leaders can uncover the hidden conditions that shape performance and learn where meaningful improvements can be made, helping the community become better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-conditionsLinks: Blog about LEODSI and PETTEOT: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH298: Beyond the Floor: Why Meeting the Standard Isn't the Same as Being Safe 22.07.2026 17min

  This episode challenges the common belief that following diving standards automatically makes diving safe. It explores how industry standards, while important, can create an illusion of safety when compliance becomes the main goal rather than improving real-world performance. The discussion examines how many diving standards are written and assessed by the same organisations they are meant to guide, creating a closed system that can protect institutions legally while limiting opportunities for deeper learning and improvement. It also looks at why accident investigations often focus on individual mistakes rather than questioning whether the procedures, training, or standards themselves are fit for purpose. Drawing on research from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the episode argues that safer diving requires more than rule-following—it needs independent oversight, greater transparency, and a willingness to learn from outside safety science. True progress comes not from assuming yesterday’s standards are enough, but from building systems that can recognise their own limits and continually improve.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/beyond-the-floorLinks: Diving Talks: 'Compliance provides an illusion for safety in divingInDepth article: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/Suggested further readingAmalberti, R. (2001) The paradoxes of almost totally safe transportation systems. Safety Science, 37(2–3), pp. 109–126. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092575350000045XCarpenter, D. and Moss, D. (eds.), Preventing Regulatory Capture (Cambridge University Press, 2014). https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/preventing-regulatory-capture/Dekker, S., The Safety Anarchist (Routledge, 2018) and Compliance Capitalism (Routledge, 2022). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Safety-Anarchist-innovation-bureaucracy-compliance-ebook/dp/B0FCCZCTG5Dixon-Woods, M., Yeung, K., & Bosk, C. L. (2011). Why is UK medicine no longer a self-regulating profession? The role of scandals involving “bad apple” doctors. Social Science & Medicine, 73(10), 1452–1459. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.08.031Hopkins, A., Failure to Learn: The BP Texas City Refinery Disaster (CCH Australia, 2008). https://www.amazon.co.uk/Failure-Learn-Texas-Refinery-Disaster/dp/1921322446Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., and Hollnagel, E., What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find: The consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals, Safety Science 47(10), 2009. https://www-sciencedirect-com.ludwig.lub.lu.se/science/article/pii/S0925753509000137Meyer, J. and Rowan, B., Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, American Journal of Sociology 83(2), 1977. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2778293.pdfRae, A., Provan, D., Weber, D., and Dekker, S., Safety Clutter: The Accumulation and Persistence of 'Safety' Work That Does Not Contribute to Operational Safety, Policy and Practice in Health and Safety 16(2), 2018. https://doi.10.1080/14773996.2018.1491147Thompson, D., Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands, American Political Science Review 74(4), 1980.Tags: THD-English| THD-Operations & Procedures
• 
  SH297: CRM, ISO 8804, and Scientific Diving: Opportunities and Existing Materials 18.07.2026 17min

  This episode explores the growing recognition that safe and effective scientific diving depends on more than technical skill, equipment, and certification. Prompted by new research into applying Crew Resource Management (CRM) to scientific diver training, it examines why communication, leadership, teamwork, and decision-making are essential in complex underwater operations where divers must manage both life support and scientific tasks under pressure. Drawing on lessons from aviation, healthcare, and other high-risk industries, the discussion highlights key challenges such as cognitive overload, distributed situational awareness, and authority gradients that can prevent divers from speaking up or adapting effectively when conditions change. It also reviews the existing research, training tools, and practical frameworks already available to support this shift, while recognising that long-term improvement depends on treating diving safety as an ongoing process of learning rather than a box-ticking exercise. The message is clear: true safety is built through the conditions teams create, the culture they sustain, and how they respond when concerns are raised—always striving to be better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/CRM-and-Scientific-DivingLinks: Original LinkedIn post: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/raymond-arce-528304355_cd37166-scientificdiving-divertraining-share-7460336156979888128-ASrc/?utm_source=social_share_send&utm_medium=member_desktop_web&rcm=ACoAAAELqPcBwf1_VKIPpplosn5XZ02d6xlOzRs9th Annual European Conference on Scientific Diving: https://ecsd9azores.com/Resilient Performance Model blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelOutcomes are a Function of…..: https://youtu.be/nkdVHBDnCjc?t=2293Looking at CRM relevant failures: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotGuide to Diving Crew Resource Management: https://www.thehumandiver.com/commercial-occupational-divingMoving beyond the position that compliance means safety: https://indepthmag.com/compliance-provides-an-illusion-of-safety-in-diving/ReferencesCaramanna, G., & Strickland, B. (2023). Risk Management for Diving Operations: How to enhance the safety and proficiency of diving teams. Self-published. ISBN: 979-8988399612.CSA Group (2026). CSA Z275.2: Occupational Health and Safety Code for Diving Operations. Toronto: CSA Group.Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(2), 350–383.Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 32–64.Flin, R., & Maran, N. (2004). Identifying and training non-technical skills for teams in acute medicine. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 13(suppl 1), i80–i84.Flin, R., O'Connor, P., & Crichton, M. (2008). Safety at the Sharp End: A Guide to Non-Technical Skills. Farnham: Ashgate.Health and Safety Executive (2011). Research Report RR871: Assessment of Manual Operations and Emergency Procedures for Closed Circuit Rebreathers. London: HSE Books.International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (2018). Report 503: Introducing Behavioural Markers of Non-Technical Skills in Oil and Gas Operations. London: IOGP.Lock, G. (2019). Under Pressure: Diving Deeper with Human Factors. Milton Keynes: Human in the System Consulting.Lock, G. (2023). Human factors and rebreather diving. In: Pollock NW, ed. Rebreather Forum 4. Proceedings of the April 20-22, 2023 workshop. Valletta, Malta; 2024. p. 57–69.O'Brien, E., & Caramanna, G. (2017). Human factors in scientific diving: an experimental approach. In Proceedings of the AAUS Diving for Science Symposium 2017. Thunder Bay National Marine Sanctuary: American Academy of Underwater Sciences.Piispanen, W., Lundell, R., Tuominen, L., & Räisänen-Sokolowski, A. (2021). Assessment of alertness and cognitive performance of closed circuit rebreather divers with the Critical Flicker Fusion Frequency Test in Arctic diving conditions. Frontiers in Physiology, 12, 722915.Reader, T. W., & O'Connor, P. (2014). The Deepwater Horizon explosion: non-technical skills, safety culture, and system complexity. Journal of Risk Research, 17(3), 405–424.Reitz, M., Nilsson, V., Day, E. and Higgins, J. (2019). Speaking truth to power at work. Hult Research.Sinek, S. (2019). The Infinite Game. New York: Portfolio/Penguin.Stanton, N. A., Stewart, R., Harris, D., Houghton, R. J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Salmon, P., Hoyle, G., Walker, G., Young, M. S., Linsell, M., Dymott, R., & Green, D. (2006). Distributed situation awareness in dynamic systems: theoretical development and application of an ergonomics methodology. Ergonomics, 49(12–13), 1288–1311.Sweller, J. (1988). Cognitive load during problem solving: effects on learning. Cognitive Science, 12(2), 257–285.Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., & Maran, N. (2006). Development of a rating system for surgeons' non-technical skills. Medical Education, 40(11), 1098–1104.Tags: THD-English| THD-CRM, Leadership & Teamwork
• 
  SH296: When 'I'm Fine' Isn't True: Speaking Up and Ending the Dive 15.07.2026 13min

  This episode explores a diving incident where nothing officially “went wrong,” yet a series of small decisions and social pressures nearly led to tragedy. A newer CCR diver and his wife joined more experienced divers on an unfamiliar shore dive, and although they surfaced safely, the dive revealed how easily people can ignore warning signs when they feel pressure to fit in, avoid disappointing others, or challenge more experienced teammates. Drawing on research into speaking up, psychological safety, and stop-work authority, the episode examines why divers often stay silent even when they feel uncomfortable, and why near-misses are rarely reported or discussed. It argues that the absence of accidents does not mean a system is safe, and that real safety depends less on rules and policies and more on leadership, team culture, and how people respond when someone calls a dive. The discussion highlights the importance of curiosity, open communication, and creating environments where stopping a dive is treated as good judgement rather than failure, helping divers and teams learn before luck runs out.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-im-fine-isnt-trueLinks: Resources page including the DEBrIEF guide and building psychological safety: https://www.thehumandiver.com/resourcesTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH295: Four Ways We Talk About 'Human Factors' in Diving 11.07.2026 11min

  This episode explores what people really mean when they talk about “human factors” in diving—and why the term can sometimes create more confusion than clarity. It looks at four different ways the phrase is commonly used: blaming “the human factor” when something goes wrong, focusing on what is happening inside the diver such as stress or decision-making, examining the external conditions that shape performance like equipment, procedures, and team dynamics, and finally viewing diving as a complex socio-technical system where people, technology, organisations, and the environment all interact. While the first three approaches can offer useful insights, they often miss the bigger picture. Real learning and lasting safety improvements come from understanding how the whole system works together, not just identifying individual mistakes. By shifting from blame to systems thinking, instructors and divers can better understand why outcomes occur and make meaningful changes that help everyone become better than yesterday.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/four-ways-of-hfTags: THD-English| THD-Education & Content Type
• 
  SH294: Clickbait, trolls and comments. How dive incident posts can teach us — if we let them 08.07.2026 13min

  Discussions about diving incidents on social media often follow a predictable pattern: a short, simplified post describes what happened, and comments quickly focus on blaming the individual involved, creating a sense of clear-cut failure and easy lessons. This happens not because people have bad intentions, but because simple, linear stories and knowing the outcome push our brains toward hindsight judgement, making complex situations seem obvious after the fact. As a result, important factors like conditions, pressures, communication, and decision-making context are ignored, limiting real learning. Over time, this blame-focused culture encourages people to share less detail or avoid posting altogether, which removes the very information needed to understand incidents properly. To improve learning, the community needs to shift from asking “what went wrong” to “why it made sense at the time,” and respond to posts with curiosity rather than judgement, creating an environment where fuller, more useful stories can be shared and understood.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/clickbait-trolls-and-commentsTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH293: Why does nothing change? Why do the same failures keep happening? 04.07.2026 22min

  Over the past decade, diving fatalities have remained stubbornly consistent despite better equipment, more training, and growing participation, suggesting the problem isn’t just technical or individual error. Current safety approaches focus on equipment, skills, and counting deaths, but often ignore deeper issues like communication, teamwork, decision-making, and the wider system divers operate in. Research shows that most contributing factors in incidents come from these “upstream” conditions—such as training culture, social pressure, and organisational practices—rather than the diver’s final actions. A major gap is the lack of training and assessment in non-technical skills, which are critical for managing real-world situations under pressure. At the same time, diving lacks an effective system for learning from incidents, as divers are reluctant to report issues to organisations they believe won’t act on them. To improve safety, the industry needs a shared language around human performance, better systems for collecting and learning from data, and a culture that supports open, blame-free discussion—because without addressing these deeper factors, meaningful change is unlikely.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/why-does-nothing-changeLinks: Rebreather fatality documentation from RF4.0: https://indepthmag.com/rebreather-forum-4-proceedings-are-available-for-free-download/DCS study from DAN: https://journals.viamedica.pl/international_maritime_health/article/view/108038If Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonlyLinnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensDivers Alert Network reporting: https://dan.org/research-reports/research-studies/diving-incident-reporting-system/BSAC reporting: https://www.bsac.com/home/DOSA reporting: https://duikongevallen.nl/LEODSI and PETTEOT: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotBlogs about learning from incidents: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/category/learning-JC-incidentsTags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH292: Learning or Blaming: The Choice the Diving Industry Needs to Make. Part 3 of 3. 01.07.2026 14min

  This final blog explores what the research means and how the diving community can realistically improve learning and safety. It argues that the problem is not broken individuals but a system that quietly encourages blame and silence, making it hard for divers to share honest stories about mistakes and near-misses. Fear—of legal action, criticism, or damage to reputation—plays a big role, even when that fear is not based on real outcomes. The result is weak feedback loops, where lessons from real experiences never reach the people who design training or shape the culture. The blog suggests shifting focus from the idea of a formal “just culture” to a more practical “culture of justness,” where fairness, understanding, and learning are encouraged at a local level by respected leaders. It also highlights how sharing more context reduces blame and improves learning, but notes that most divers are never taught how to do this. While there is no single fix, the way forward includes clearer language, better-designed reporting systems, role modelling by instructors and experienced divers, and introducing honest discussions about incidents into training. Ultimately, meaningful change will come from gradually shifting behaviours and norms, so that sharing real experiences becomes normal, supported, and valued across the diving community.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-3-the-outcomesLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spacePart 2: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-resultsThe full thesis, Storytelling to Learn: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater, was submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the MSc in Human Factors and System Safety at Lund University, 2024. Gareth Lock is the founder of The Human DiverReferences:Dekker, S. (2009). Just culture: Who gets to draw the line? Cognition, Technology & Work, 11(3), 177–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10111-008-0110-7EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Exley, S. (1986). Basic cave diving: A blueprint for survival. National Speleological Society – Cave Diving Section. https://nsscds.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Blueprint-for-Survival.pdfHeffernan, M. (2011). Wilful blindness: Why we ignore the obvious. Simon and Schuster.Hoffman, B. G. (2012). American icon: Alan Mulally and the fight to save Ford Motor Company. Crown.Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: A modelling problem. Safety Science, 27(2–3), 183–213.Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH291: What the Data Told Us: Fear, Trust, and the Stories That Never Get Told. Part 2 of 3. 27.06.2026 13min

  This blog explains how a mixed-methods study explored why divers struggle to share honest, learning-focused stories about incidents. Using a large international survey, focus groups, and expert interviews, the research found that storytelling is strongly shaped by organisational culture, fear, and trust. Many divers—especially instructors—fear legal consequences, criticism, or damage to their reputation, which stops them from speaking openly, particularly in public settings. At the same time, there is confusion about key ideas like what counts as an “incident,” what “risk” really means, and what a “just culture” looks like, with very few divers linking incidents to learning. The study also showed that when stories include more context, people are less likely to judge and more likely to learn, but most divers are not taught how to do this. Overall, the findings suggest the diving community knows that sharing near-misses and building a just culture would improve safety, but lacks the trust, understanding, and organisational support needed to make that happen.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-2-the-data-and-resultsLinks and references: British Diving Safety Groiup: https://bdsg.org.uk/Chan, W. T.-K., & Li, W.-C. (2023). Development of effective human factors interventions for aviation safety management. Frontiers in Public Health, 11, 1144921. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2023.1144921EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Tags: THD-English| THD-Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH290: What Happens Underwater, Stays Underwater — And That's a Problem. Part 1 of 3 24.06.2026 12min

  This episode introduces the problem behind learning in diving safety, using the 2020 death of Linnea Mills to highlight how incidents are often caused by deeper system issues, not just individual mistakes. While near-misses and accidents happen regularly in diving, most are never shared or analysed, meaning valuable lessons are lost. Unlike industries such as aviation or healthcare, diving lacks strong reporting systems, regulation, and reliable data, so decisions are often based on uncertainty rather than evidence. Existing reports tend to focus on immediate causes like equipment failure or diver error, but miss the wider social, organisational, and environmental factors that shape outcomes. The episode argues that meaningful learning comes from “context-rich” stories that explain not just what happened, but why it made sense at the time. Drawing on safety research from other industries, it highlights the need for a stronger reporting culture, psychological safety, and system-level thinking to improve learning and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/msc-part-1-the-problem-spaceReferences: Dekker, S. (2017). Just culture: Restoring trust and accountability in your organization (3rd ed.). CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.Drupsteen, L., & Guldenmund, F. (2014). What is learning: A review of the safety literature to define learning from incidents, accidents and disasters. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 22(2), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5973.12039EC. (2014). Regulation (EU) No 376/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014. European Commission.Gigerenzer, G. (2014). Risk savvy. Viking. https://www.amazon.co.uk/Risk-Savvy-Make-Good-Decisions/dp/1846144744Lock, G. (2011). The application of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to improve diving safety. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Iz3qRRyo2NjdiBGbPcRhj14NoCTuuM4/view?usp=share_linkMills v Gull Dive Center PADI (2022). https://www.scribd.com/document/555406095/Mills-v-Gull-Dive-Center-PADI-2nd-Amended-ComplaintOrlady, H. W., & Orlady, L. M. (2017). Human factors in multi-crew flight operations (1st ed.). Routledge.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315543543Snowden, D. (2002). Complex acts of knowing: Paradox and descriptive self-awareness. Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(2), 100–111. https://doi.org/10.1108/13673270210424639Waring, J. J. (2005). Beyond blame: Cultural barriers to medical incident reporting. Social Science & Medicine, 60(9), 1927–1935. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2004.08.055Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH289: Chac Mool - Diving Deeper into a Triple Fatality with Human Factors 20.06.2026 24min

  This episode examines a 2012 triple fatality at Cenote Chac Mool in Mexico using a Human Factors approach, showing how accidents are rarely caused by a single mistake but by a combination of small, interacting factors. A guide took two recreational divers beyond safe limits into an overhead cave environment without a continuous guideline, and all three ran out of gas and died. Instead of simply blaming the guide, the analysis explores how things made sense at the time, including authority gradients that stopped the divers from questioning decisions, fatigue from multiple dives, pressure to show something impressive, and increasing task load in a complex environment. Using the PETTEOT framework, the case highlights how people, environment, equipment, organisational culture, and time pressures combined to reduce safety margins until there was no capacity left to recover. The key lesson is that safety depends on understanding these system interactions, building psychological safety so people can speak up, and reinforcing clear rules and preparation to prevent small, “normal” deviations from turning into fatal outcomes.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/chac-mool-triple-diving-fatalityLinks: Full CREER manual: https://creer-mx.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Manual-for-Cenote-Dive-Guides-vs010324.pdfThe Thumb rule: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-psychological-safety-and-the-thumb-ruleLearning from Emergent Outcomes course waiting list: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH288: The 'Obvious Thing' Nobody Noticed 17.06.2026 15min

  This episode explores the fatal case of 18-year-old Linnea Mills to show how visible hazards can go unnoticed when an instructor lacks the mental capacity to recognise them. Linnea was overweighted, unable to inflate her drysuit, and using equipment that couldn’t provide enough lift—risks that seem obvious in hindsight but were missed due to a combination of inexperience, time pressure, unfamiliar gear, and commercial expectations. Using models like ECOM and COCOM, the episode explains how an instructor’s attention can be consumed by immediate tasks, leaving no capacity to monitor the bigger picture or reassess whether a dive should proceed. This isn’t about blaming an individual, but understanding how systems, workload, and limited experience can overwhelm decision-making. The key lesson is that effective instructors don’t just rely on skill, but on preparation—setting clear plans, checks, and limits before the dive—to protect their ability to recognise problems when it matters most.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedLinks: Part 1: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkThe Linnea Mills case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• 
  SH287: When the Picture Goes Dark 13.06.2026 16min

  This episode explores why divers don’t truly “lose” situation awareness, but instead run out of the mental capacity needed to maintain it. Through the story of James on a challenging wreck dive, it shows how increasing demands—like current, task focus, and effort—can quietly narrow attention until the bigger picture is lost, even when skills and training are sound. Using two human factors models, COCOM and ECOM, the discussion explains how control shifts from broad, strategic thinking to narrow, reactive behavior as workload rises, and how different layers of awareness—from basic task execution to overall planning—can break down under pressure. It highlights that mistakes are often not about poor decisions, but about limited cognitive resources in the moment. The episode also emphasizes the importance of good preparation, clear decision thresholds, teamwork, and deliberate pauses to manage workload, while showing how reflection after the dive helps improve future performance. Ultimately, it reframes the difference between novice and experienced divers as the ability to manage attention and maintain the bigger picture, not just technical skill.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkLinks: A 2026 study in Safety Science by Woltjer and colleagues: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753526000822Part two: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• 
  SH286: The Shortcut That Gets You Home — and the One That Doesn't 10.06.2026 10min

  Divers make many decisions quickly, often without realising it, by using heuristics—mental shortcuts that help us act fast when time and information are limited. These shortcuts are essential and often effective, especially with experience, but they can also lead to predictable errors called biases when used in the wrong situation. Common examples include relying too much on recent experience, sticking to an original plan despite changing conditions, or only noticing information that supports what we already believe. In diving, where conditions vary and feedback is often limited, these biases can quietly increase risk. The key is not to avoid intuition, but to understand when it might be misleading and to slow down when needed. Tools like checklists, realistic training, and open team communication help balance fast thinking with more careful decision-making, improving safety and helping divers make better choices underwater.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/shortcuts-errors-and-the-gapLinks: Gigerenzer’s push for people to be “risk savvy”: https://www.jasoncollins.blog/posts/nudging-citizens-to-be-risk-savvyBlog about the Scylla wreck tragedy: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiBlog about the IJN Sata incident: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• 
  SH285: When Skill Alone Isn't Enough: The Resilient Performance Model 06.06.2026 11min

  Diving operations rarely fail because people lack skill; they fail when skilled individuals are not supported by the systems around them. The Resilient Performance Model from The Human Diver explains that performance comes from the interaction of three areas: technical skills, non-technical skills like communication and decision-making, and the wider context such as culture, workload, and resources. When one of these areas is weak or missing, problems appear—such as highly skilled divers working in silence, well-coordinated teams lacking critical skills, or strong systems where people feel unable to challenge decisions. True resilience happens when all three are aligned, allowing teams to adapt when things go wrong and still achieve safe outcomes. The key lesson is that improving safety isn’t just about better training or stricter procedures, but about creating an environment where people can speak up, make good decisions under pressure, and learn from both successes and failures to improve over time.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelTags: Commercial Diving
• 
  SH284: LEODSI and PETTEOT: A Systems Approach for Understanding How Diving Really Works 03.06.2026 12min

  When something goes wrong in diving, people often ask “who made the mistake?”, but that question usually oversimplifies what really happened and stops us from learning. The Learning from Emergent Outcomes framework (LEODSI) takes a different approach by looking at diving as a system, where outcomes are shaped by many interacting factors rather than one person’s actions. It examines seven key elements—people, environment, tasks, equipment, external pressures, organisation, and time—to understand how decisions made sense in the moment and how conditions combined to produce the result. Instead of blaming individuals, LEODSI focuses on why events unfolded the way they did, recognising that both successes and failures come from the same system. By using this approach in everyday debriefs, not just after incidents, divers and teams can learn more effectively, improve safety, and make meaningful changes that reduce risk in the future.https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• 
  SH283: You're Accountable. You're Responsible. You're It! 30.05.2026 17min

  This piece explores how diving incidents are often misunderstood by focusing too quickly on blame rather than learning. It explains the important difference between responsibility (who was involved) and accountability (who answers for the outcome), showing that incidents are usually caused by a chain of decisions, pressures, and system factors—not just one person’s mistake. By comparing “blame questions” (who is at fault?) with “learning questions” (why did it make sense at the time?), it highlights how real improvement comes from understanding the conditions that led to an error. Through examples like missed safety checks, risky habits becoming normal, ignored concerns, and unreported near-misses, the text shows how blame cultures stop people speaking up and allow problems to grow. Instead, it argues for a learning-focused approach where divers, instructors, and organisations reflect on decision-making, encourage honest reporting, and examine the wider system. The key message is that accountability should not be about punishment, but about creating an environment where people can speak openly, learn from mistakes, and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/youre-accountable-youre-responsible-youre-itLinks: Blog about the Scylla wreck incident: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiIJN SATA case study: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensPDF guide: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ugx0lQM5am2gQ9rJa4aCq39JBukGZyLK/view?usp=sharingRuth Parris: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ruth-parris-76a53635/Ruth’s thesis: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9186204Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture