Counter-Errorism in Diving: Applying Human Factors to Diving

Епизоде

• SH287: When the Picture Goes Dark 13.06.2026 16мин

  This episode explores why divers don’t truly “lose” situation awareness, but instead run out of the mental capacity needed to maintain it. Through the story of James on a challenging wreck dive, it shows how increasing demands—like current, task focus, and effort—can quietly narrow attention until the bigger picture is lost, even when skills and training are sound. Using two human factors models, COCOM and ECOM, the discussion explains how control shifts from broad, strategic thinking to narrow, reactive behavior as workload rises, and how different layers of awareness—from basic task execution to overall planning—can break down under pressure. It highlights that mistakes are often not about poor decisions, but about limited cognitive resources in the moment. The episode also emphasizes the importance of good preparation, clear decision thresholds, teamwork, and deliberate pauses to manage workload, while showing how reflection after the dive helps improve future performance. Ultimately, it reframes the difference between novice and experienced divers as the ability to manage attention and maintain the bigger picture, not just technical skill.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-picture-went-darkLinks: A 2026 study in Safety Science by Woltjer and colleagues: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925753526000822Part two: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-obvious-thing-nobody-noticedTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• SH286: The Shortcut That Gets You Home — and the One That Doesn't 10.06.2026 10мин

  Divers make many decisions quickly, often without realising it, by using heuristics—mental shortcuts that help us act fast when time and information are limited. These shortcuts are essential and often effective, especially with experience, but they can also lead to predictable errors called biases when used in the wrong situation. Common examples include relying too much on recent experience, sticking to an original plan despite changing conditions, or only noticing information that supports what we already believe. In diving, where conditions vary and feedback is often limited, these biases can quietly increase risk. The key is not to avoid intuition, but to understand when it might be misleading and to slow down when needed. Tools like checklists, realistic training, and open team communication help balance fast thinking with more careful decision-making, improving safety and helping divers make better choices underwater.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/shortcuts-errors-and-the-gapLinks: Gigerenzer’s push for people to be “risk savvy”: https://www.jasoncollins.blog/posts/nudging-citizens-to-be-risk-savvyBlog about the Scylla wreck tragedy: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiBlog about the IJN Sata incident: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Tags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• SH285: When Skill Alone Isn't Enough: The Resilient Performance Model 06.06.2026 11мин

  Diving operations rarely fail because people lack skill; they fail when skilled individuals are not supported by the systems around them. The Resilient Performance Model from The Human Diver explains that performance comes from the interaction of three areas: technical skills, non-technical skills like communication and decision-making, and the wider context such as culture, workload, and resources. When one of these areas is weak or missing, problems appear—such as highly skilled divers working in silence, well-coordinated teams lacking critical skills, or strong systems where people feel unable to challenge decisions. True resilience happens when all three are aligned, allowing teams to adapt when things go wrong and still achieve safe outcomes. The key lesson is that improving safety isn’t just about better training or stricter procedures, but about creating an environment where people can speak up, make good decisions under pressure, and learn from both successes and failures to improve over time.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/resilient-performance-modelTags: Commercial Diving
• SH284: LEODSI and PETTEOT: A Systems Approach for Understanding How Diving Really Works 03.06.2026 12мин

  When something goes wrong in diving, people often ask “who made the mistake?”, but that question usually oversimplifies what really happened and stops us from learning. The Learning from Emergent Outcomes framework (LEODSI) takes a different approach by looking at diving as a system, where outcomes are shaped by many interacting factors rather than one person’s actions. It examines seven key elements—people, environment, tasks, equipment, external pressures, organisation, and time—to understand how decisions made sense in the moment and how conditions combined to produce the result. Instead of blaming individuals, LEODSI focuses on why events unfolded the way they did, recognising that both successes and failures come from the same system. By using this approach in everyday debriefs, not just after incidents, divers and teams can learn more effectively, improve safety, and make meaningful changes that reduce risk in the future.https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-leodsi-petteotLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoTags: Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH283: You're Accountable. You're Responsible. You're It! 30.05.2026 17мин

  This piece explores how diving incidents are often misunderstood by focusing too quickly on blame rather than learning. It explains the important difference between responsibility (who was involved) and accountability (who answers for the outcome), showing that incidents are usually caused by a chain of decisions, pressures, and system factors—not just one person’s mistake. By comparing “blame questions” (who is at fault?) with “learning questions” (why did it make sense at the time?), it highlights how real improvement comes from understanding the conditions that led to an error. Through examples like missed safety checks, risky habits becoming normal, ignored concerns, and unreported near-misses, the text shows how blame cultures stop people speaking up and allow problems to grow. Instead, it argues for a learning-focused approach where divers, instructors, and organisations reflect on decision-making, encourage honest reporting, and examine the wider system. The key message is that accountability should not be about punishment, but about creating an environment where people can speak openly, learn from mistakes, and prevent future incidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/youre-accountable-youre-responsible-youre-itLinks: Blog about the Scylla wreck incident: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiIJN SATA case study: https://wreckedinmyrevo.com/2023/11/16/close-call-on-the-ijn-sata-palau-120-fsw/Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensPDF guide: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Ugx0lQM5am2gQ9rJa4aCq39JBukGZyLK/view?usp=sharingRuth Parris: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ruth-parris-76a53635/Ruth’s thesis: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9186204Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH282: Isolation Amplifies Drift: When Remote Operations Make Small Deviations Invisible 27.05.2026 11мин

  This blog by Michael John Snow explores how small equipment issues on a remote expedition vessel can gradually become accepted as “normal,” not because of poor decisions, but because of how isolated systems work. In these environments, teams are skilled and focused on keeping operations running, especially when guests, tight schedules, and limited support make stopping costly. With fewer external checks and less immediate feedback, minor irregularities are often monitored rather than acted on, and over time they fade into the background. This process, known as normalization of deviation, slowly shifts what is seen as acceptable without anyone clearly deciding to take a risk. When a problem finally forces action, it can look sudden, but it is usually the result of many reasonable choices made over time. The key message is that this isn’t about individual failure, but about system design: isolation reduces challenge, delays response, and makes it easier for risk to build unnoticed. To manage this, the blog argues that remote operations need stronger structures—like clear governance, tracking, and shared visibility of equipment performance—so that small issues stay visible and are addressed before they become bigger problems.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/isolation-amplifies-driftLinks: Governance mechanisms: https://remoteassetgovernance.com/frameworkTags: English| Operations & Procedures
• SH281: HMS Scylla Wreck Penetration Tragedy: Two Perspectives on Learning 23.05.2026 37мин

  This episode looks at the 2021 wreck diving tragedy on HMS Scylla, where three experienced divers entered the wreck and only one survived. It first examines the kind of reaction often seen on social media, where the incident is explained as a series of obvious mistakes made by individuals. It then explores the same event using a human factors and systems approach called LEODSI, which looks at how people, environment, equipment, tasks, organisational culture, and time interact to shape decisions and outcomes. Instead of asking “who failed?”, this perspective asks how normal behaviour, built on experience, trust, and familiar conditions, can combine with changing environments, increasing stress, and limited time to slowly reduce safety margins. By understanding how these factors interacted to produce the outcome, the aim is to help the diving community learn in a deeper way and improve the overall system so that safer decisions become easier and tragedies like this are less likely to happen.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/scylla-wreck-penetration-leodsiLinks: Interview with Adam on the Deep Wreck Diver Youtube channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMYKjZocinsLinnea Mills Case: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensDeath of a 12 year old in Texas during Open Water training: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhLearning from Emergent Outcomes: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoDive Talk review of the interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WvCr3_pX4a4Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH280: This Could Happen to Any Dive Operator: What We Can Really Learn From The Perth Diving Academy Incident 20.05.2026 9мин

  This episode explores the serious incident in which two divers were accidentally left behind by a dive boat near Rottnest Island while diving with Perth Diving Academy. Rather than treating it as the failure of one operator, the discussion looks at how a simple error—such as a headcount mistake—can reveal deeper weaknesses in safety systems that may exist across the dive charter industry. It explains how many operations rely on habits, assumptions, and informal checks that usually work, but can fail when conditions change. The episode also looks at the limits of fines and punishment, which rarely help the wider industry learn unless there is transparency about what actually went wrong. Instead of blaming a “bad operator,” the focus is on understanding how safety systems drift over time, why single points of failure are dangerous, and how stronger safety comes from multiple checks, open feedback from staff and customers, and a culture of continuous improvement that looks for problems before they turn into accidents.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/this-could-happen-to-any-dive-operatorLinks: Australian Maritime Safety Authority: https://www.amsa.gov.au/How we measure safety in diving: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-does-safe-meanSystems in diving: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-road-to-excellence-systems-and-structure-form-the-foundation-of-a-culture-of-improvementTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH279: The Tower Was Already Full of Holes 16.05.2026 9мин

  This episode looks at how diving incidents are often explained by blaming the last person involved, much like blaming the person who pulls the final brick from an already unstable Jenga tower. While that person may be the last to act, many other factors—such as environment, equipment, training, social pressure, and organisational practices—may already have weakened the system. Through several real diving examples, the episode shows how accidents usually develop from a combination of conditions rather than a single mistake. It also explains why people are quick to blame individuals: it is easier, it protects our sense of safety, and it is what we are used to seeing in the media and official reports. Instead of asking what someone “should have done,” the more useful question is how their actions made sense at the time with the information and resources they had. By shifting from judgement to curiosity and looking at the wider system, divers and instructors can learn more from incidents and improve both their technical and non-technical skills to make future dives safer.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/and-still-the-tower-is-standingLinks: “Blaming a bad apple is like wetting your pants”:https://indepthmag.com/do-bad-apples-actually-exist/Blog about the death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensBlog about the death of a 12 year old child in Texas: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhWait list for Learning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoFacebook group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/184882365201810/permalink/2729409417415746/Tags: English| Safety & Risk Management
• SH278: Be Curious, Not Judgemental 13.05.2026 6мин

  This episode looks at how quick judgement, especially online, can block learning and make diving less safe. Using a real example of an adaptive scuba training video that received harsh criticism, it explains how people often react without understanding the full context. The episode introduces two key ideas from Human Factors: psychological safety, where people feel safe to ask questions and speak up, and just culture, where the focus is on learning instead of blame. The main message is simple: when people judge, learning stops, but when people stay curious, learning begins. By slowing down, asking questions, and trying to understand why decisions made sense at the time, dive teams and the wider community can make better choices, create safer environments, and build a healthier culture for everyone.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/be-curious-not-judgementalLinks: Original Facebook post and video: https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1DnwV8qM1r/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH277: You are entering water with known problems, and don't kid yourself that it's any different. 09.05.2026 11мин

  This episode explores why people often go diving even when something feels “off,” and how risk usually starts before anyone gets in the water. It explains that danger doesn’t come from one big mistake, but from small pressures like stress, tiredness, rushing, poor communication, and cutting corners that slowly build up and start to feel normal. Over time, these small compromises become habits, and people stop seeing them as problems at all. The key message is that safety isn’t just about following procedures underwater — it’s about noticing when your safety margin is already shrinking on the surface. Real safety comes from having the courage to stop, slow down, and ask not “Can we do this dive?” but “Do we still have enough room for things to go wrong?”Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/you-are-entering-water-with-known-problemsLinks: Work as Imagined vs Work as Done blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/Work-as-Imagined-vs-Work-as-DoneTags: English| Safety & Risk Management
• SH276: If there are no silver bullets, build capacity to fail safely 06.05.2026 14мин

  This episode explores what real safety improvement in diving could look like if we stop copying other industries and start designing for the reality of diving itself. It explains that diving is commercial, lightly regulated, and full of everyday trade-offs between safety, money, time, and training, which means risk can’t be removed — only managed. Instead of relying only on rules and checklists, the focus should be on building “margin” into the system: better training time, safer conditions, lower ratios, rested instructors, better decision-making, and a culture where stopping a dive is normal, not failure. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from paperwork alone, but from building real capacity — skills, time, support, learning systems, and honest culture — so people can make good decisions under pressure and prevent small compromises from slowly turning into serious danger.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/no-silver-bullets-build-capacityTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH275: The death of a child in diver training. There are no ‘silver bullet’ solutions 02.05.2026 30мин

  This episode looks at the tragic death of 12-year-old D.H. during a scuba training dive and explains it not as one person’s mistake, but as a failure of the whole system around her. Using court documents and a safety science approach, the analysis shows how many “normal” things came together — rushed training, poor visibility, tired staff, missing safety equipment, weak rules, money pressure, and lack of oversight — to create a situation where there was no real safety margin left. The key message is that this was not a random accident or a single bad decision, but the result of a system that allowed risky practices to become normal. The goal is not blame, but learning: understanding how everyday routines, shortcuts, and pressures can slowly increase danger, and how changing the system — not just individuals — is the only real way to prevent this from happening again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/learning-from-tragedy-dhLinks: Court filings: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/26789283-dylanharrisonlawsuit/Purpose of investigation blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLearning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoPsychological safety: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Research around “stop work” orders: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352017590_Deciding_to_stop_work_or_deciding_how_work_is_donehttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0925753517308871RSTC guidance and Standards: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNRrrosDJYsTrade off between performance, cost and resources: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=555Regulated environments such as military aviation: https://www.mdpi.com/2313-576X/8/2/37Barriers to learning from adverse events: https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/9151225Social acceptance of drift: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/normalisation-of-deviance-not-about-rule-breakingWork as Imagined vs Work as Done: https://youtu.be/vtgIwHrUWVQ?list=PLNXuyLsCTX6hHS3newpcROfJ_JiI27q3C&t=962Performance Influencing Factors: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/top-tips-for-diving-instructors-performance-influencing-factorsThe shoot down of two Black Hawks: https://www.mindtherisk.com/literature/150-friendly-fire-the-accidental-shootdown-of-u-s-black-hawks-over-northern-iraq-by-scott-a-snookRebreather Forum 4.0 talk: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nkdVHBDnCjcChallenger and Columbia disasters: https://www.montana.edu/rmaher/engr125/CAIB-History%20as%20a%20cause.pdfLoss of HMNZ Manawanui: https://nzdf.mil.nz/court-of-inquiry-hmnzs-manawanuiThe death of LCpl Partridge: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d305623ed915d2feeac4a0f/LCpl_Partridge_Service_Inquiry_Parts_1.1._to_1.6_REDACTED_ONLINE_VERSION.pdfThe death of ADR Yarwood: https://www.nzdf.mil.nz/assets/Uploads/DocumentLibrary/Redacted-Death-Able-Diver-COI-Rpt-for-publication.pdfSafety Science for Outdoor and Experiential Learning book: https://www.amazon.com/Safety-Science-Outdoor-Experiential-Education-ebook/dp/B0G99BD12G/ref=sr_1_1The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH274: When Do We Stop Asking “Why?” 29.04.2026 14мин

  This episode explores why asking “why did this happen?” after a diving accident is important — but not enough on its own. It explains that investigations often stop too early, not because everything is understood, but because people reach a point that feels comfortable, simple, or easy to fix. Many reports focus on equipment failures or individual mistakes, while deeper causes like pressure, workload, training culture, time limits, and business realities are left out. The episode shows that real learning comes from looking at how normal routines, shortcuts, and everyday decisions shape what people do, not just what went wrong at the end. The main message is clear: the goal of asking “why” isn’t to find someone to blame, but to understand the system well enough to change future behaviour — so the next dive is safer, even under pressure and imperfect conditions.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-do-we-stop-asking-whyLinks: Learning from Emergent Outcomes and LEODSI: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoSome relevant blogs: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchhttps://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationReferences:Kletz, T. A. (2006). Accident investigation: Keep asking “why?”. Journal of hazardous materials, 130(1-2), 69-75.Reason, J. (2016). Managing the risks of organizational accidents. Routledge.Reason, J. (1991). Too little and too late: A commentary on accident and incident reporting systems. In Near miss reporting as a safety tool (pp. 9-26). Butterworth-Heinemann.Rasmussen, J. (1990). Human error and the problem of causality in analysis of accidents. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B, Biological Sciences, 327(1241), 449-462.Rasmussen, J. (1988). Coping safely with complex systems. In AAAS Annual Meeting 1988.Cedergren, A., & Petersen, K. (2011). Prerequisites for learning from accident investigations–a cross-country comparison of national accident investigation boards. Safety Science, 49(8-9), 1238-1245.Lessons from Longford: the Esso Gas Plant Explosion. Andrew Hopkins. CCH Australia, Sydney. 2000Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnagel, E. (2010). What you find is not always what you fix—How other aspects than causes of accidents decide recommendations for remedial actions. Accident Analysis & Prevention, 42(6), 2132-2139.Manuele, F. A. (2016). Root-Causal Factors: Uncovering the Hows & Whys of Incidents. Professional Safety, 61(05), 48-55.Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH273: What story gets told? What words are used? Who gets to the tell the multiple stories? 25.04.2026 9мин

  This episode looks at two very different ways of telling the same tragic story — the death of a 12-year-old girl during a scuba training dive in Texas — and why the way we tell these stories matters for real safety. The first version focuses on blame, emotion, and individual failure, which feels powerful but pushes people toward anger instead of learning. The second version looks at how the whole system shaped what happened, including training pressure, poor visibility, equipment choices, fatigue, class structure, and missing safety checks. Instead of asking “who failed,” it asks how normal practices, routines, and decisions slowly combined to create dangerous conditions. The key message is simple: real prevention doesn’t come from blaming people, it comes from understanding how systems work in everyday conditions — and changing those systems so tragedies like this are far less likely to happen again.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-story-gets-told-what-words-are-usedLinks: Why hurting prevents changeWhat is the purpose of an investigationSharing stories: https://youtu.be/DRXqeQvRFK0Linnea Mills case: https://youtu.be/lu4tc8gtNioTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH272: Seeing what is ‘unseen’: applying human factors to citizen science 22.04.2026 9мин

  This episode explores how divers often overlook the richness of underwater environments they think they already know, and how greater awareness can transform both safety and understanding. Using real examples from rivers, lakes, and glacial landscapes, it shows how underwater spaces are shaped by nature, history, and human activity, even when they look simple on the surface. The episode explains how human factors help divers make better decisions, communicate clearly, and work more effectively as teams, while citizen science gives divers a way to contribute real knowledge to research and conservation. The core message is that when divers learn to look more carefully, every dive becomes more meaningful — improving safety, protecting underwater heritage, and turning ordinary dives into opportunities to learn, discover, and contribute.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/seeing-what-is-unseen-scientific-divingTags: Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology
• SH271: When the Story Hurts Too Much to Change 18.04.2026 10мин

  This episode explores why diving accidents involving children create such strong reactions and deep divisions, and how our need for simple explanations often gets in the way of real learning. It explains how people quickly form strong opinions after tragedies, not because they don’t care about safety, but because events like this challenge their beliefs about control, training, and protection. To feel safe again, communities often rush to blame individuals, which brings emotional comfort but blocks deeper understanding. The episode shows how psychology, identity, and group thinking shape these reactions, and why early public stories become hard to question. The key message is that real safety comes from slowing down, asking harder questions, and looking at the wider system — the pressures, culture, and conditions that shape decisions — instead of just asking who is at fault.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/when-the-story-hurts-too-muchLinks: The moral dimension of an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationCognitive dissonance: https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/cognitive-dissonanceBlame providing moral comfort: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationSuppressing events: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DRXqeQvRFK0The death of Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensTags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH270: Safe diving starts from the system. Not from the human. 15.04.2026 16мин

  This episode explores how accidents in diving and other high-risk jobs are often blamed on individuals, even when the real causes are deeper problems in the system, such as pressure, poor communication, lack of support, broken procedures, and unsafe cultures. Using real examples from rescue diving, healthcare, aviation, and emergency services, it shows how “blame cultures” create fear, silence, and hidden mistakes, which makes future accidents more likely. In contrast, “learning cultures” focus on understanding how systems shape behaviour, encourage people to speak up, and treat mistakes as chances to learn rather than punish. The message is clear and practical: safety improves when organisations build trust, psychological safety, and open reporting, so problems can be fixed before they turn into tragedies — because you can’t fix what people are too afraid to talk about.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/safe-diving-starts-from-the-system-not-from-the-humanLinks: Report about the search operation (in Polish): https://www.trojmiasto.pl/wiadomosci/Zarzuty-za-smierc-strazaka-Zginal-podczas-poszukiwan-Grzegorza-B-n203080.htmlWhen CRM isn’t implemented (in Polish): https://remiza.pl/nik-grupy-psp-potrzebuja-wsparcia-a-system-reform/2025 Mid-air collision: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Potomac_River_mid-air_collision#Blog about the reasons for undertaking an investigation: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationBlameless post mortems: https://sre.google/sre-book/postmortem-culture/Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH269: What Is the Purpose of an Investigation in Diving? 11.04.2026 11мин

  This episode looks at how diving accidents are often explained in simple ways that blame individuals, instead of exploring the deeper systems and pressures that shape what really happens. It explains that investigations are not just about facts, but about meaning, comfort, and fear after someone has died, which often leads to stories that focus on “human error” instead of learning. Using real examples, it shows how simple explanations may feel reassuring, but they don’t make diving safer. Real prevention comes from understanding how people, training, culture, pressure, equipment, and organisations interact in complex ways. The key message is that safety doesn’t come from finding someone to blame — it comes from changing the conditions that shape decisions and behaviour, so future dives are genuinely safer, not just easier to explain.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/what-is-the-purpose-of-an-investigationLinks: Dekker’s four competing purposes: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1463922X.2014.955554Fatal maritime collision investigation: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeNon-fatal maritime collision investigation: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014Blog about Linnea Mills: https://www.thehumandiver.com/blog/linnea-mills-death-hf-systems-lensIf Only… documentary: https://www.thehumandiver.com/ifonlyLearning from Emergent Outcomes course: https://www.thehumandiver.com/lfeoReferences:Dekker: The psychology of accident investigation: epistemological, preventive, moral and existential meaning-making. 2015. Another link. https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/items/d0de2c1f-08f8-43b2-9d30-2a4ff6baea09/fullMAIB Report: https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-ro-ro-passenger-vessel-scottish-viking-and-prawn-trawler-homeland-off-st-abb-s-head-scotland-with-loss-of-1-lifeDMAIB Report: https://dmaib.com/reports/2014/kraslava-and-atlantic-lady-collision-on-1-november-2014A fellow graduate from Lund University wrote about this “Why do we ask why? Finding meaning after a violent loss.”Tags: English| Learning, Incidents & Just Culture
• SH268: The Hidden Cost of "Never Show Weakness": Why Hiding Instructor Errors Undermines Dive Safety 08.04.2026 9мин

  This blog explains why hiding mistakes in diving training and leadership is dangerous, and why honesty builds safer, stronger teams. Using real examples from military service and diving, it shows that when leaders admit errors, teams learn faster, trust each other more, and make better decisions. When mistakes are hidden, people stop asking questions, small problems become normal, and serious risks grow over time. The article introduces the idea of psychological safety — creating an environment where people feel safe to speak up, admit mistakes, and challenge unsafe actions without fear. It argues that real credibility comes from honesty, not pretending to be perfect. By encouraging openness, shared responsibility, and learning instead of blame, dive teams can prevent accidents, improve performance, and build a culture where safety, trust, and learning come first.Original blog: https://www.thehumandiver.com/post/the-hidden-cost-of-never-show-weakness-why-hiding-instructor-errors-undermines-dive-safetyTags: English| Sense-making, Decision-making, & Psychology