Brussels Sprouts

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  Front Line Dynamics, Deep Strikes, and a Theory of Victory 21.08.2026 1год 2хв

  Brussels Sprouts is back after our summer hiatus, and we’re jumping right back into Ukraine.Over the past several weeks, the war has entered a more dynamic and dangerous phase. Ukraine has expanded its campaign deep inside Russia, striking military and industrial targets, logistics hubs, and infrastructure supporting the war effort while continuing efforts to isolate Crimea and raise the costs of the war for ordinary Russians. Russia, meanwhile, is intensifying its own campaign against Ukraine. As Kyiv grapples with a growing shortage of air and missile defenses, Moscow has increased the pace and sophistication of its long-range strikes, relying on a larger number of ballistic missiles designed to overwhelm Ukraine’s increasingly constrained defenses. At the same time, Russia has stepped up attacks on Ukraine’s ports, grain infrastructure, and commercial shipping, threatening one of Ukraine’s most important economic pillars, just as the country enters another harvest season.The military partnership between Moscow and Pyongyang also continues to deepen, with Russia employing improved North Korean ballistic missiles and reports suggesting that North Korea could send additional missile personnel—and potentially tens of thousands more troops—to support Russia’s war effort. These battlefield developments are unfolding alongside an expanding Russian hybrid campaign across Europe, underscoring that the conflict is increasingly spilling beyond Ukraine itself and placing growing pressure on NATO and the broader European security environment.To help us make sense of these dynamics, we’re delighted to welcome Jeff Edmonds and Rob Lee back to Brussels Sprouts.Jeff Edmonds is the president of True North Policy, a senior analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses, and an adjunct fellow with the Center for a New American Security.Rob Lee is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and a former Marine infantry officer. 
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  Ukraine's Command Shake-Up: Fedorov Out, Drapatyi In 24.07.2026 52хв

  On July 15th, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy dismissed now–former Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov, one of the architects of Ukraine’s technological transformation on the battlefield. His abrupt dismissal sparked protests in Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, with demonstrators calling for the removal of Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, whose more traditional approach to the war had increasingly clashed with Fedorov’s vision. Days later, Zelenskyy dismissed Syrskyi as well, replacing him with Mykhailo Drapatyi—a respected frontline commander who represents a younger generation of officers shaped by the war with Russia since 2014. The changes come during a time when Ukraine has regained some battlefield momentum, raising hopes that Kyiv may accelerate both military reform and offensive operations. The shake-up also raises broader questions about Ukraine’s wartime leadership. What does it reveal about civil-military relations and competing visions for how Ukraine should fight? Could the political fallout fuel calls for elections? And what might these leadership changes mean for the future course of the war? To answer these questions and more, we are excited to welcome Melinda Haring and Ambassador Bill Taylor to Brussels Sprouts.Melinda Haring is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and an expert on Ukraine. Ambassador Bill Taylor is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. 
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  Forecasting the Future of the Axis of Upheaval: The View from Moscow 17.07.2026 1год 27хв

  Today’s episode of Brussels Sprouts comes from a virtual panel discussion that the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) held on July 14 to mark the release of a report titled Forecasting the Future of the Axis of Upheaval: The View from Moscow. The report assesses the future of the “axis of upheaval,” or the deepening relationships among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, from Moscow’s perspective. The report is set amid growing doubts about Russia’s ability to support its partners abroad in Syria, Venezuela, and Armenia amid the crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet while Russia did little to help Iran during 12 days of punishing strikes from Israel and the United States in 2025, Russia provided more tangible support for Iran this year. These incidents raise important questions. How does Russia view its relationships with China, North Korea, and Iran? How far would Russia be willing to go to support its partners? What are the factors that drive its cooperation, and what are the limitsJoining Andrea Kendall-Taylor on the panel to address all these questions are three distinguished experts: Nicole Grajewski, Marcin Kaczmarski, and Kadri Liik.Nicole Grajewski is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a tenure-track assistant professor at Sciences Po in Paris.Marcin Kaczmarski is a lecturer of Central and East European studies in the School of Social & Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow.Kadri Liik is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe and was previously the first director of Estonia’s International Centre for Defence and Security. 
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  Europe Stepping Up and the United States Stepping Back 10.07.2026 51хв

  This week, the Allies met for the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye, in what was billed as a summit of low expectations. President Donald Trump once again created headlines with public comments about Greenland and criticism of European allies for failing to support the United States during the Iran conflict—but by most accounts, the conversations behind closed doors were far more constructive, and the summit avoided the kind of transatlantic rupture that many feared. Outcomes were positive for Ukraine as the European allies and Canada made clear that they are now the backbone of support. Trump also told President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that the United States will license the production of Patriot missile interceptors in Ukraine.Overall, the biggest takeaway then wasn't politics at all, but procurement. Through the NATO Defense Industry Forum, the Allies announced more than $50 billion in new procurement and industrial agreements, signaling that NATO is moving beyond talking about defense spending to actually building the industrial capacity needed to sustain deterrence.Taken together, these developments raise a broader question about the future of the alliance. In many ways, the summit offers a glimpse of what some analysts are calling NATO 3.0, a model in which Europe assumes much greater responsibility for its own defense, while the United States remains the alliance’s strategic backstop. If that is indeed where NATO is headed, are we seeing the emergence of a more sustainable transatlantic bargain? Or are we creating new risks for deterrence and alliance cohesion?To answer these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Ian Brzezinski and Torrey Taussig to this week’s edition of the show.Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy.Torrey Taussig is the director of and a senior fellow with the Transatlantic Security Initiative at the Scowcroft Center and a former director for European affairs on the National Security Council. 
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  Prospects for Ukraine and a Look Ahead to Ankara 26.06.2026 50хв

  The past month has featured a series of major transatlantic gatherings that together tell an important story about where the alliance is headed. At the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Sweden, allies focused on strengthening Europe's role within NATO through higher defense spending, expanded defense industrial production, and continued support for Ukraine. But the meeting also underscored growing uncertainty about America’s long-term role in European security following the announcement of a U.S. review of its military posture in Europe, a move that reinforced allies’ concerns that the future of the U.S. military presence on the continent will shrink.  The G7 summit in France offered a more optimistic note. Leaders pledged additional military support for Ukraine, including air defense and long-range capabilities. And many came away encouraged that President Trump appeared to be taking a tougher line toward Vladimir Putin. But we've seen this movie before. Trump has repeatedly shifted between promises of greater pressure on Russia and renewed optimism about engaging Putin, making it far too early to conclude that a lasting change in U.S. policy is underway.  That brings us to the NATO summit in Ankara on July 7th and 8th, where those competing trends will be put to the test. Expectations are pretty modest. Allies will be looking for reassurances about America’s long-term commitment to Europe, greater clarity on the U.S. posture review, and evidence that recent optimism on Ukraine is warranted. At the same time, leaders will be trying to maintain alliance unity while advancing Europe’s growing role in its own defense.   To connect all these dots and look forward, we're very happy to have Benedetta Berti and Kurt Volker back on Brussels Sprouts.  Benedetta Berti is the Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  Ambassador Kurt Volker is the Advisory Board Co-Chair for BGR Group and former U.S. Ambassador to NATO and U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. 
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  Getting the Brits Ready to Fight 22.06.2026 56хв

  On June 22, United Kingdom (UK) prime minister Keir Starmer announced that he would resign as leader of the Labour Party and leave the premiership. Starmer had faced mounting pressure to hand the position over to a new leader after local elections in May that were disastrous for the party, but the decision came after Labour’s Andy Burnham, popular mayor of Greater Manchester, won a special election for a seat in parliament and signaled on June 19 that he would use it to challenge Starmer for leadership of the country.All of this comes after both the UK’s defence minister, John Healey, and armed forces minister, Al Carns, announced on June 11 that they had resigned from their positions. Both former ministers cited funding for the military as the reason for their departures. Healey issued a letter warning that the level of military spending proposed by Starmer “falls well short” of what is needed. Carns stated that the government’s defense investment plan was “neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded.” The plan, which lays out the funding for military equipment and services, has faced months of delays amid budget disputes within the government. Earlier this month, Chief of the Defence Staff Richard Knighton also said that the UK is running out of time to boost defenses in response to Russian threats, and that risks to the country are greater than at any time since the Cold War.The UK’s struggles highlight two questions that Europe has yet to answer:  Can governments generate the political support needed for significantly higher defense spending? And with the United States playing a smaller role, who will provide the leadership needed to organize and drive Europe’s security efforts?To discuss all of this and more, we are excited to welcome back to Brussels Sprouts Shashank Joshi and Tom Wright. Please note that this episode was recorded on Friday, June 19, before Starmer’s official resignation but when it was clear that he would be challenged. Shashank Joshi is the incoming Washington bureau chief at The Economist and was previously the publication’s defense editor. Tom Wright is a senior fellow with the Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy and Technology at the Brookings Institution. 
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  Brussels Sprouts Live: Four Ambassadors Reimagine the Transatlantic Relationship 17.06.2026 25хв

  Today's episode comes from the CNAS Annual Conference held last week in Washington, D.C. The theme of this year's conference was “New Rules,” and nowhere is that more evident than in the transatlantic relationship. As Europe takes on greater responsibility for its own security and Washington reassesses its role on the continent, both sides are grappling with fundamental questions. What should the next chapter of the transatlantic partnership look like? What principles, expectations, and responsibilities will define the relationship going forward? Those questions were at the heart of a conversation Andrea Kendall-Taylor moderated on reimagining the transatlantic relationship. Joining her were four distinguished ambassadors: Ambassador Laurent Bili of France, the European Union’s Ambassador Jovita Neliupšienė, Denmark's Ambassador Jesper Møller Sørensen, and Swedish Ambassador Urban Ahlin. We hope you enjoy the discussion. This episode was recorded on June 11th, 2026.
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  U.S. Posture Changes and the Future of European Defense Planning 05.06.2026 50хв

  Over the last several weeks, European allies have been trying to interpret a steady stream of signals from Washington about the future of the U.S. military role in Europe, discussions we've covered on the last two episodes of Brussels Sprouts. Beyond the headlines about troop levels, the broader concern is that the United States may be preparing to scale back some of the critical capabilities that have long formed the backbone of NATO’s deterrence posture, including the forces and enablers needed to rapidly reinforce Europe in a crisis. The uncertainty has exposed deeper questions about how decisions on U.S. force posture are made, how allies should prepare for a potentially smaller American role, and whether Europe is moving fast enough to adapt to a more demanding security environment. These debates are particularly acute in Germany, where questions about deterrence, defense spending, and Europe’s long-term security architecture are increasingly central to the political conversation.To help us dig into these issues and what they all mean for the future of transatlantic security, we’re very happy to welcome Mara Karlin and Liana Fix to this week’s edition of Brussels Sprouts.Liana Fix is a senior fellow for Europe at the Council on Foreign Relations.Mara Karlin is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution and a professor of practice at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. 
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  Window of Opportunity? Deterrence and Moscow’s Calculus 29.05.2026 54хв

  In the last episode of Brussels Sprouts, we looked at the dizzying series of U.S. announcements about America’s military posture in Europe. Since then, new reporting has emerged. The Wall Street Journal reports that the Pentagon is preparing allies for a much larger reduction in the U.S. forces earmarked to reinforce Europe in a crisis—including reductions in bombers, naval assets, and refueling tinkers. In other words, this is not just about troop numbers on the continent today. It’s about whether the United States will still provide the critical enablers that have long underpinned NATO’s ability to deter and, if necessary, fight a major war in Europe. Moscow is watching all of this closely, and the timing matters. As Washington signals that it intends to do less, Russia is increasing pressure on NATO’s eastern flank.   In recent weeks, Moscow has threatened Latvia over false claims that it is allowing Ukraine to use its territory or airspace to launch drone attacks against Russia. Baltic officials have rejected those claims, but the pattern is familiar: Manufacture a grievance, amplify it, and use it to build the foundation to justify future aggression. At the same time, Russia is facing growing domestic strain, which we’ve talked about here on Brussels Sprouts as well, raising questions about whether Putin needs a permanent state of confrontation with the West to sustain his hold on power. So, with all of this, today we are asking a central question: Does Russia see opportunity in this moment, one in which the United States may be pulling back faster than Europe can fill the gap?  To help us understand the view from Moscow, we’re very pleased to welcome back to Brussels Sprouts a series of former intelligence officials: Nate Reynolds, Pete Schroeder, and Jeff Edmonds.  Peter Schroeder is an expert on Russian foreign and security policy with nearly two decades of experience working on Russia and Eurasia in various roles in the intelligence community. He is an adjunct fellow with the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).  Nate Reynolds is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and also a longtime intelligence official. Jeff Edmonds is the president of True North Policy, an adjunct fellow with CNAS, and also a very longtime intelligence veteran. 
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  U.S. Military Posture and Implications for European Security 27.05.2026 45хв

  Over the last several weeks, U.S. allies have been trying to make sense of a dizzying series of announcements about America’s military posture and broader role in Europe. First came reports that the Trump administration planned to withdraw roughly 5,000 troops from Germany following a public dispute with Chancellor Friedrich Merz over the war with Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Pentagon paused the deployment of thousands of U.S. troops to Poland—a move that blindsided officials in Warsaw, particularly because Poland has consistently positioned itself as a model ally. Then, in another abrupt reversal, President Donald Trump announced that the United States would instead send an additional 5,000 troops to Poland, though it remains unclear whether these are new forces, previously paused deployments, or units being shifted from elsewhere in Europe.These announcements hung heavy over last week’s NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Sweden, where Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaled that Washington would step back from playing the leading role in negotiations between Russia and Ukraine after months of stalled diplomacy. Rubio also emphasized that European allies would need to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense, reinforcing the sense that the United States is narrowing the scope of its role in European security.At a moment when Russia continues to pressure NATO’s eastern flank, the debate is no longer whether the United States will reduce its role in Europe but how fast, how coherently, and with what consequences for deterrence and alliance cohesion.To help us unpack all of this, Douglas Lute and Justyna Gotkowska join Brussels Sprouts this week to discuss. Justyna Gotkowska is deputy director and head of the Security and Defence Department at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. Ambassador Douglas Lute is chair of BGR Group’s International and Trade Practice and its Defense and Critical Technologies Practice. He is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant general and formerly served as the U.S. permanent representative to NATO. 
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  A State of “Unorder?” 08.05.2026 1год

  As conversations about the status of the liberal world order swirl in capitals on both sides of the Atlantic, many are realizing that old ways of thinking about the rules-based order, power, and international cooperation may no longer hold. Mark Leonard’s new book, Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail, argues that we need a fundamentally different way of thinking about the future. The current moment may not be a world between orders, but a new state of durable “unorder,” defined by four big structural forces—climate, chips, capital, and civilizations—along with the biggest source of the chaos behind them: China. Chaos has become the system, Leonard argues, and rather than looking for order, Europeans should figure out how to have agency. Surviving Chaos is especially relevant given the U.S. war with Iran, demonstrating how today’s crises overlap and reinforce one another. Energy shortfalls, food insecurity, nuclear proliferation, and global economic shocks all occur simultaneously. Do today’s crises signal a deeper shift toward unorder? Are shared rules and assumptions still relevant? And what does this mean for Europe and how can it adapt?To discuss these questions and much more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Mark Leonard to this week’s edition of the podcast.Mark Leonard is cofounder and director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. 
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  Rising Domestic Pressure in Russia? 01.05.2026 55хв

  Over the last several weeks, strain within Russia's domestic political system has become increasingly apparent. The Kremlin has intensified digital controls, intermittently disrupting mobile internet access and placing growing pressure on foreign platforms, including the widely used Telegram messaging service. Authorities have also expanded efforts to restrict VPN use. While the government frames these measures as necessary to guard against Ukrainian drone attacks, public frustration appears to be mounting. Russians have attempted to hold protests and are voicing complaints on social media, with one video expressing grievances by an influencer and former reality TV star going viral.Discontent is also surfacing among segments of the elite. Politicians in the “systemic opposition,” along with some members of United Russia, have publicly questioned aspects of the tightening restrictions. Business leaders and economic officials concerned about mounting costs and disruptions have signaled unease. At the same time, structural pressures in the economy are becoming more pronounced. Despite benefiting from elevated energy revenues, Russia faces persistent inflation, fiscal strain, and an acute labor shortage. Putin’s central banker was just out declaring an unprecedented labor shortage driven by an exodus of 1.5 million people and about 1.3 million casualties in the war. Individually, neither tightening information controls nor economic strain is likely to drive political change. But taken together, do these pressures point to something more consequential? And what do they mean for Russia's future?To answer these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Alexander Gabuev and Joshua Yaffa to the show.Alexander Gabuev is the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.Joshua Yaffa is a contributing writer at The New Yorker and the author of Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia, which won the Orwell Prize in 2021. 
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  Transatlantic Adaptation: A More European NATO? 24.04.2026 51хв

  Doubts about U.S. reliability and the future of NATO are top of mind for most in the transatlantic community. The concerns that spiked after President Donald Trump’s threats to seize Greenland have gained new urgency amid the standoff over Europe’s position on America’s war in Iran. The tensions in U.S. relations with Europe were on full display earlier this month during President Trump’s meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington and afterward when Trump berated NATO allies online, calling the alliance a paper tiger.   In the context of these criticisms and threats, European officials are reportedly working on fallback plans to ensure Europe can maintain deterrence against Russia, preserve command and control, and replace military assets if the United States departs the alliance. All of this raises fundamental questions about the future of the NATO alliance. How can Europe maintain credible deterrence with less U.S. involvement? And what is the latest thinking on how the alliance needs to adapt?  To tackle these questions and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome back Ivo Daalder and Camille Grand to this week’s edition of the podcast.  Ivo Daalder is a former U.S. ambassador to NATO and previously served as president and chief executive officer of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Camille Grand is secretary general of the Aerospace, Security, and Defence Industries Association of Europe and previously served as assistant secretary general for defense investment at NATO.
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  Orban Out: The Impact on European Politics, Ukraine, and Democracy 17.04.2026 56хв

  On April 12, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban conceded defeat in the country’s general elections, which ousted his party Fidesz and ended his rule of 16 years. The election was widely seen as a referendum on Orban’s self-described “illiberal democracy,” and his loss is a blow to the global nationalist movement promoted by U.S. President Donald Trump. Peter Magyar, a former ally of Orban and the founder of Tisza, the main opposition party, will take over as prime minister once the new parliament convenes.The defeat is striking not just because Orban held power for so long but because of just how rigged the Hungarian system was in his favor. Over 16 years, Orban’s party tilted the electoral system to its advantage, stacked the judicial system and independent agencies, and took control of most news media. Magyar and his party’s message focused on economic dissatisfaction and anticorruption, which resonated with voters and prompted record turnout. And Magyar’s Tisza party win has broader implications for Europe. In the short term, without Orban advocating for the Kremlin’s interests, blocking European assistance to Ukraine, and watering down sanctions against Russia, change in Hungary will likely yield positive results for Ukraine.To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Rosa Balfour and Dan Kelemen to this week’s edition. Rosa Balfour is the director of Carnegie Europe.R. Daniel Kelemen is the McCourt Chair at Georgetown University’s McCourt School of Public Policy. 
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  European Perspectives on the U.S.-Iran Conflict 10.04.2026 54хв

  On April 7, after more than five weeks of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 14-day ceasefire, provided Iran allows passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The following day, the leaders of seven European states—plus Canada, the European Commission, and the European Council—released a joint statement welcoming the ceasefire, encouraging a negotiated settlement, and announcing that their governments “will contribute to ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”The group included the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, and Spain, which has especially angered President Trump for its opposition to the war. Leaders from each of these countries and the European Union have also called for the ceasefire to include Lebanon, which the United States and Israel say was not part of the agreement. On a planned visit to the Gulf, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer emphasized the importance of opening the Strait of Hormuz, saying it is the “job” of leaders to do so. France’s top military commander said that the French government was considering “strictly defensive” military options to assist.That same day, Trump met with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte in Washington as part of a long-scheduled visit. Trump reportedly used the meeting to vent his frustration with NATO allies over their refusal to back the U.S. war with Iran, signaling that he was considering reprisal. Trump, who has repeatedly threatened to pull the United States out of the alliance, berated NATO allies online following the meeting and alluded to his previous threats to annex Greenland—which precipitated the last major crisis in the transatlantic relationship before the war with Iran.  To make sense of these developments, Brussels Sprouts is happy to welcome back Constanze Stelzenmüller and Sophia Besch to this week’s edition of the podcast.  Sophia Besch is a senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  Constanze Stelzenmüller is the director of the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. The episode was recorded on April 10, 2026. 
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  The War in Iran, a Benefit to Putin 31.03.2026 52хв

  While the world's attention has turned to the war with Iran, the war in Ukraine continues. Russia has seemingly kicked off its spring offensive, but a meaningful breakthrough remains unlikely. Moscow has increased the tempo of its operations, relying more heavily on mechanized and motorized assaults, an approach that is typical for this time of year. Yet last year's experience suggests limited prospects for success. Despite a similar surge last year, Russian forces achieved only marginal gains while incurring significant equipment losses, ultimately forcing Russian forces to relatively quickly return to smaller scale infiltration tactics.Meanwhile, the war in Iran will affect dynamics in Ukraine. The most pressing concern for Ukraine is its air and missile defense. Russia is expanding production of ballistic missiles and improving their effectiveness. Kyiv remains heavily dependent on U.S.-provided systems to intercept these threats, with no real viable alternative currently available. The United States is rapidly expending these resources in the Middle East. And the longer that conflict continues, the more it is likely to exacerbate Ukraine's vulnerability. Financially, Russia is also benefiting from the war with Iran. Higher oil prices and the easing of US sanctions are pumping higher revenue into Russia's coffers. Although Ukraine is taking bold steps to disrupt Russia's energy exports, a prolonged period of higher energy prices will, at a minimum, alleviate the economic strain that Moscow was feeling earlier this year.To discuss these dynamics and much more, Brussels Sprouts is very happy to welcome Elina Ribakova and Ambassador Bill Taylor to the show this week. Ambassador Bill Taylor is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council's Eurasia Center and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine.Elina Ribakova is vice president for foreign policy at the Kyiv School of Economics and a non-resident senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.
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  The United States, Iran, and the Risk to NATO 27.03.2026 57хв

  On March 14, in the wake of a global energy shock triggered by the United States military campaign against Iran, President Donald Trump called on allies to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian attacks on commercial shipping have disrupted oil flows. European leaders responded cautiously, and in many cases negatively, as they tried to balance concerns about the conflict with the need to preserve relations with Washington. German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius was blunt, saying, “This is not our war.” United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Keir Starmer struck a more measured tone, pledging to work with allies to restore freedom of navigation, but emphasizing that the UK would “not be drawn into the wider war.” The following day, Trump raised the stakes, warning that NATO faces a “very bad” future if allies fail to act. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte expressed confidence that members would ultimately come together to secure the strait. But the incident has already exposed deep unease in Europe, both about the trajectory of the conflict and on the future of the transatlantic alliance.To discuss all of this and more, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook and Jeremy Shapiro to this week’s show. Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook is executive vice president at the Bertelsmann FoundationJeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, where he focuses on U.S. foreign policy and transatlantic relations 
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  Europe’s New Nuclear Deterrence Debate and France's Answer 13.03.2026 49хв

  On March 2, 2026, in a speech at France’s Île Longue base, French President Emmanuel Macron unveiled major changes to France’s nuclear deterrence doctrine. First, Macron announced an increase, the first since 1992, in France’s nuclear stockpile. France currently maintains 290 warheads and will increase that number to a now-undisclosed count. He also announced a new doctrine, what he called “forward deterrence.” This is a partnership with seven European countries—Germany, Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Sweden—on strategic issues. That cooperation will include partner participation in nuclear exercises and the potential for France to temporarily deploy nuclear armed fighter jets to other European countries. While France will maintain the independence of its nuclear command and control and remain outside of NATO’s nuclear mission, this extension of the French nuclear umbrella represents a significant shift in French policy in response to the new realities of the European security environment, which includes a less reliable commitment from the United States.  To help us understand these changes and to talk through broader implications of a declining U.S. presence in Europe for European strategic deterrence, Brussels Sprouts is excited to welcome Claudia Major and Bruno Tertrais to this week’s show.  Claudia Major is the senior vice president of Transatlantic Security at the German Marshall Fund.  Bruno Tertrais is the deputy director of the Foundation for Strategic Research and a non-resident fellow at the Institut Montaigne. 
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  Europe’s View on Operation Epic Fury 05.03.2026 52хв

  On February 28, the United States launched Operation Epic Fury, a major military campaign against Iran carried out alongside Israeli strikes. The opening wave targeted Iranian command and control nodes, missile forces, and military infrastructure across multiple cities and included a decapitation strike that killed the supreme leader. The conflict quickly spread beyond Iran itself. Tehran has retaliated with missile and drone strikes across the Gulf, hitting U.S. and allied targets in countries including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and even striking the British military base in Cyprus.From Europe, the response has been sharply divided. Spain’s government has rejected what it called the “unilateral military action” by the United States and Israel and denied U.S. forces the use of Spanish bases for the operations. Sitting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz in the White House, President Donald Trump slammed Spain’s position and threatened to cut off trade with Madrid. And Spain hasn’t been Trump's only target—Trump has been highly critical of UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer. After Starmer said the UK did not support regime change from the sky and initially blocked the use of UK bases for strikes, Trump said of his counterpart, “this is not Winston Churchill we are dealing with,” and that the special relationship between the United States and the UK is “not what it was.” Across European capitals, officials are also bracing for the consequences: fears of a new refugee crisis, evacuations of citizens from countries across the Gulf, higher energy prices, cyber and terrorism threats, and concerns that a widening Middle East conflict could further strain already tight munitions supplies needed to support Ukraine. To discuss all this and much more, Brussels Sprouts welcomes Steven Erlanger and Julian Barnes-Dacey. Steven Erlanger is the chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times and is based in Berlin. Julien Barnes-Dacey is the director of the Middle East & North Africa program at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 
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  Reflecting on Four Years of War in Ukraine 27.02.2026 50хв

  This week marks the four-year anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Brussels Sprouts wanted to mark this somber milestone with a look at the conflict and the ongoing efforts to secure a durable end to the war. Even as the war in Ukraine shows no signs of an imminent end, the international community, and the allies in Europe in particular, have been working on the foundations of a credible security guarantee for Ukraine once the fighting ends. Part of this line of effort has been the proposed creation of a multinational force, which could be deployed to Ukraine once the hostilities cease to serve as a visible reassurance force. Perhaps more critically, the multinational force could help Ukraine regenerate its military forces and strengthen its own ability to deter further Russian aggression.Led by the United Kingdom and France, the multinational force has the potential to be a key pillar of Ukraine's future security, yet there are lingering questions about what the force aims to do and how it will function.The UK Minister for the Armed Forces Al Carns joins Brussels Sprouts to share insights on the multinational force, the state of the war at this four-year mark, and UK views on the changing dynamics in the European security landscape.Alistair Carns has served as the UK minister for the armed forces since September 2025 and as a member of Parliament since 2024. Before holding elected office, he served as an active-duty Royal Marine officer for 25 years.